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Constitutional Framework of the Future Palestinian State 
Synthesis of Leading Palestinian thinking and public perceptions 
 
Asem Khalil

 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
A. The "Anomalous" Palestinian Constitutional System 
 
The term ‘constitution’ means different things to different people. According to the material 
definition, a constitution refers to a comprehensive system of government while in a formal 
sense it denotes a specific document, with special legal inviolability, which sets out the 
framework and the principal functions of the organs of the state. For the purpose of this 
report, both concepts will be used as required. Furthermore, despite the fact that written 
constitutions are normally associated with state sovereignty, contemporary constitutional 
developments prove that they may be drafted, and even enacted under conditions of 
occupation and therefore prior to statehood.  
 
The Palestinian Authority (hereinafter the PA)
1
 is a good example of the contradictions 
inherent in the role of a constitution and its place in a particular (non-state, pre-state or quasi-
state) legal system. At present, there is a Basic Law (hereinafter the BL) which is enforced in 
the territory under PA control, and a Draft Palestinian Constitution (hereinafter the DPC) is 
also circulating.
2
 At the same time, the 1968 Palestinian National Charter (hereinafter the 
Charter) remains, formally, in force, although considered by many as 'old fashioned' since it 
renounced the armed resistance as a means to national liberation (Nofal 1997, 87). 
Furthermore, the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter the PLO) unilaterally 
proclaimed the establishment of a new independent state called the ‘State of Palestine’ 
in 1988 but this did not lead directly to the realization of statehood. Therefore it remains an 
aspiration and future objective as the Israeli occupation persists and the ‘State of Palestine’ 
has still to be established. Throughout this report, reference will be made to both the BL and 
the DPC as these documents represent the current and the future Palestinian constitutional 
framework.  
 
                                                
 This report was completed in May 2007. Since then, the paper passed through long editing process. In 
the meanwhile many events took place, including Hamas's military control of Gaza and declaration of 
emergency by President Abbas. Those events had direct impact on issues tackled in this report and 
need to be updated, but could not be covered since this report has different time frame. The author 
wishes to thank all those who contributed to the realization and revision of this work, mainly to Yara 
Jalajel, Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Sorbonne and research assistant at the Institute of Law.  
1 It is commonly used with the term ‘national’ in between the two words, relating to the temporary 
nature of its authority over the Palestinian national project. Without prejudicing this concept, this paper 
will use the term PA.  
2 The BL endorsed by the President of the PA in 2002 was adopted by the Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) in 1997. The version adopted by the PLC was prepared by its legal committee who took 
on the task from a PLO committee. As for the DPC, it was prepared by a special committee nominated 
by Yasser Arafat in his capacity as Chairperson of the PLO Executive Committee. 
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The first attempt to prepare a BL or a constitution followed the Palestinian Declaration of 
Independence in Algiers in 1988.
3
 However, the situation changed after the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (1993) and other agreements between the PLO and the Government 
of Israel (commonly known as the Oslo Accords). Therefore all subsequent efforts to prepare 
a BL were intended to regulate the PA, acting in its institutional capacity as a temporary body 
with authority to administer a limited part of the occupied Palestinian Territory (hereinafter 
oPt) until a final agreement is reached with Israel. The first drafts of a BL started to circulate 
immediately after the establishment of the PA.  
 
Following the first legislative and presidential elections (1996), changes needed to be made to 
the draft BL. The legal committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council (hereinafter the 
PLC) had taken a central role in shaping the final version of the draft BL that was approved, 
almost unanimously, by the PLC in its third reading (Law No.1/96) on the 2nd of October 
1997. Five years later, the President endorsed the BL (on 29 May 2002) which came into 
force on the 7th of July 2002. The reasons for the delay vary according to authors (Khalil 
2006b, 216-221). The official reason given by President Arafat is that the adoption of a BL is 
a matter for all Palestinians to consider and not only the PLC (Milhem 2006, 129). 
 
All laws, regulations and decisions that were in force in the oPt prior to the establishment of 
the PA remain in force, unless they are incompatible with the BL (Article 119) or until they 
are amended or repealed (Article 118): the procedure for amendment of BL is by a two thirds 
majority vote in the PLC (Article 120).  
 
According to the provisions of the BL it shall only apply during the interim period and may 
be extended until a new constitution of the State of Palestine is enforced (BL, Article 115). In 
preparation for statehood, different drafts of the DPC were prepared by a committee 
nominated by President Arafat in 1999. The first DPC was finalised in 2001 and the second 
and third drafts in 2003.
4
 It shall be noted that drafting a constitution for Palestinian statehood 
was one of the Palestinian obligations under the ‘Road Map’5.  
 
Mahmoud Abbas was inaugurated as the first Palestinian Prime Minister following 
amendments to the DPC in 2003 but resigned less than six months afterwards after 
disagreements with the President on matters relating to his constitutional powers and, 
according to some analysts, for political visions (Al-Masri 2003, 20). Ahmad Qurei replaced 
him as Prime Minister and remained in this post during Abbas’ Presidency. In both cases, the 
issue of power relations between the Presidency and the Prime Minister remained an internal 
party political issue.
6
 It was only after Hamas' victory 2006 elections that these constitutional 
issues, related to the institutions and processes of governance, surfaced again. This time, 
fundamental issues such as the right of the President to call for a referendum or early 
elections; the limitations of adopting decree-laws; the separation of powers between the 
President and the Office of the Prime Minister mainly with regard to control over the security 
forces; and the controversial adoption of a law establishing a Constitutional Court were 
widely debated in public and became the focus of inter-party dialogue.  
 
                                                
3 More precisely, the first BL was drafted following the establishment of an ‘All-Palestine 
Government’ in 1948. However, it was only following the Declaration of Independence of the State of 
Palestine that a BL was needed to regulate the newly declared state. Therefore, for this reason, no 
further reference will be made to the ‘All-Palestine Government’ related BL.  
4 Annex 4 of this paper will outline the similarities and differences between the BL and the DPC 
concerning the topics discussed in this report. 
5 A Performance Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, published 1 May 2003. 
6 See for example parts of the speech delivered by Ahmad Qurei to the PLC on 26/10/2005: Majallat 
Adderassat Al-Falasteneya, 65, 137. 
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B. Preliminary Methodological Notes 
 
This paper will look at leading Palestinian thinking and public perceptions on the following: 
 
 The relationship between the three powers of state; different perceptions of the principle 
of the ‘separation of powers’ in Palestinian literature including the potential separation 
between the PLO and the PA; 
 The systems which create, amend and enforce laws such as the PLC and the judiciary;  
 The basic rules which govern public finances including a presentation of the main 
principles included in the BL and DPC and also the reform process; and  
 The degree to which normative orientation (secular/religious) should direct state 
formation, institution building and the application of law. 
 
This report provides a structured synthesis of leading Palestinian thinking including public 
perceptions on one of the core elements of the state: the constitution. This report, however, 
contains a number of methodological gaps which will be explained below: 
 
First, it is important to mention that the thoughts and positions of so-called Palestinian ‘elites’ 
(e.g. PA and PLO officials, academics, representatives of civil society and others who 
influence public opinion) as represented in this paper do not necessarily reflect the 
perceptions of Palestinian society as a whole. As recent public opinion surveys and studies 
have shown, there is a gap between what the ‘elites’ think and what the public thinks,7 while 
recent political developments (following the 2006 elections) have shown that ‘elites’ may not 
be the only section of Palestinian society to influence the constitutional shape of a future State 
of Palestine.  
 
Second, it will therefore be necessary to make selective reference to publicly available data 
such as public opinion polls, party political charters, programs and discourses and also points 
of view published in newspapers. Due to the volume of information and reporting timeframe, 
the researcher focused on the most relevant, influential and in some cases the most accessible 
data made available to them.  
 
Third, this report is intended to objectively present the different expressions of "Palestinian 
thinking" on constitutional issues without commenting on the authors, the quality of the 
publication, or consistency of the reasoning. Some of the information presented therefore may 
need to be further developed and analyzed, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Fourth, although the issue of Palestinian statehood and related constitutional matters is of 
vital interest to the international community, and has also been widely discussed and debated 
by international academic experts, this paper is primarily focused on Palestinian perspectives. 
Therefore only minimal reference will be made to the contributions of non-Palestinians.
8
  
 
Fifth, not all topics related to the constitution have been discussed or debated in equal 
measure. For this reason, some important but sensitive discussions such as the role and 
purpose of a DPC under continuing occupation and prior to statehood, have kept a very low 
public profile. This could be said to reflect the overall preoccupations of the general public 
regarding the constitutional role of the PA itself. However, other issues such as the role of 
religion and shari'a (Islamic law) in particular, have been widely debated. This imbalance 
will inevitably be reflected in the structure of this synthesis.  
                                                
7 See for example the Opinion Leaders' Survey published on 28 February 2007 by Birzeit University 
Development Study Programme, http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/opinionpolls/elitepoll/ .  
8 For example, Nathan Brown and Katherine Wing who worked as expert consultants on the drafting 
process of the BL and the DPC respectively.  
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C. Typology of Constitutional Contributions  
 
It is possible to distinguish between two kinds of contributions to the discussion on a 
constitutional framework which will be reflected in this report:  
 
1) Talking about the PA while imagining the state  
 
The discussions on the constitutional framework of the PA (taking into account the provisions 
of the BL and limitations of the Oslo Accords) indirectly contribute to an understanding of 
how a future State of Palestine would look. This approach can be considered pragmatic and 
realistic. Some look at the existing institutions and imagine the possible political system of 
their future state (Kubba'a 1997, 97) while others look at the PA and simply see the state (at 
the same time seeing Palestine as an existent reality under occupation or in status nascendi).  
Conversely, when talking about a ‘state, reference is made to a totally different experience 
from that of the PA with its limited powers, jurisdiction and related uncertainties of the 
interim period: indeed the BL was enacted for the interim period although there is always the 
possibility that the transitional becomes permanent.  
 
Despite this, when discussing issues of Palestinian statehood, the particular experience of the 
PA needs to be considered not least because the nascent PA institutions and laws will most 
likely serve, at least in the beginning, as the new institutions of a new Palestinian state. The 
state will not start ex nihilo (from nothing) because it will inherit existing institutions and 
laws (Atalla 2003, 47), some pre-PA legislation that remained in force during the interim 
period and also PLO documentation and institutions. In fact, the BL created constitutional and 
political arrangements, as well as interests and institutions that will be difficult to dislodge 
(Aruri AND Carol 1994, 8). The State of Palestine, therefore, will necessarily absorb these 
preceding institutions whilst abiding by the legal and political texts produced by them.  
 
In fact, each historical/political period has impacted on the development of the Palestinian 
legal system. The tendency of the legislator was always to modify and adapt the legal system 
to fit with the new system. There has never been a complete rejection of previous laws and 
regulations but rather their maintenance until amended by new ones. In 1994, PLO Chairman 
Yasser Arafat issued Decree No. 1 - "Continuation of the Laws, Regulations and Rules 
Operative in the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) before and since 5 June 
1967" - until such time as it may be replaced by a unified PA legislation. The same technique 
was adopted by the BL (Article 119) and also the third DPC (Article 187) thus linking the 
current PA with a future Palestinian state.  
 
2) Imagining the Palestinian state tout court  
 
This group of contributions can be further divided into two main subgroups:  
 
First, the Palestinian state in abstract  
The state here is seen as an a-historical event that either already exists (without knowing 
where it is precisely) or which ought to exist (without deciding where it should be). This is an 
image of the state based on religious, moral, or cultural considerations, or on international law 
and legitimacy, or is simply a reflection of imagined or recognized ‘rights’. This image is then 
compared, analyzed and enriched by the experiences of other countries. In other words, this 
group sees other states and then they imagine how the Palestinian state looks or shall look 
like, irrespective of the facts on the ground. This is the vision of both the Charter, successive 
resolutions of the Palestinian National Council (hereinafter the PNC) and several declarations 
of Palestinian leaders. This vision of the state clashes with realities on the ground.  
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Second, the ‘official’ version of the state  
The contributions of this group stem from a particular text (the DPC) drafted in response to 
the PA's international obligations under the ‘Road Map’ peace plan: the first DPC was 
completed in 2001 and draft two and three in 2003.
9
 The publication of the three drafts 
initiated several discussions and studies at different levels although arguments were presented 
according to party political affiliations (Said 2004a, 7-8).
10
  
 
The most important characteristic of these discussions concerns the difference between the 
'official' version and 'unofficial' version of events. The official version comes from the 
declarations of various PA personnel and/or from members of the Constitutional Committee 
which was nominated by President Arafat in 1999, consequently leading to allegations of 
impartiality and unwarranted control by the executive (Al-Rayes 2004, 51).  
 
For Palestinian civil society, notwithstanding the importance of PA obligations to the 
international community, the importance of the constitution stems from its role in determining 
the social contract between the state and the individual (Said 2004a, 7). The DPC, in 
comparison to the BL, does not introduce any substantial changes to the legal and political 
system under the PA. However the issues that were left untreated in the BL find a place in the 
DPC.
11
  
 
Besides, the DPC contains Articles that will presumably be enforced before its final 
ratification; such as regulating the adoption of the constitution (Article 185). This anomaly 
was outlined by observers, such as Brown (2003b, 72) Al-Rayes (2004, 51) and Khalil (2006, 
296).  
 
                                                
9 One is conscious of the absence of the legal value of such a text before its adoption; however, nothing 
forbids treating the document as a text that expresses one (or more) vision(s). The DPC may provide a 
vision of how Palestinians (or at least the committee that drafted it) conceive the state, the way powers 
will be separated and the principles that will guide public institutions, and most importantly how the 
new constitution would be adopted! This vision best expresses the official approach but in places is in 
contradiction to other approaches to a constitution, including those of Palestinian civil society and 
academia. The formal approach was criticized for being too concerned with the international 
obligations of the PA rather than with Palestinian aspirations, and also more with the needs of the 
diaspora than the residents of the oPt.  
10 See for example the Executive Summary of the conference organized by the University of Birzeit, 
Development Study Program (27-28/9/2003) in: Majallat Adderassat Al-Falasteneya, 157, 137ff. 
11 These differences will be outlined throughout this report and more clearly presented in Annex 4. 
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2. Different Concepts of the ‘Separation of Powers’ 
 
The separation of powers is intended to avoid the concentration of power in one person or a 
group of persons or institutions. Accordingly, it is presented as a fundamental requirement in 
the construction of a democratic state. This type of democratic state has been the main 
objective of the Palestinian national struggle from the outset. In the Palestinian context, 
liberation (as self-determination) and democracy are presented as one and the same thing 
(Nassar 2004, 74).  
 
Discussions on the BL and the DPC were to a large extent about the possibility of creating 
democratic institutions under occupation and during a national liberation process. Three main 
positions can be outlined here:  
 
 For some, democracy can only be achieved under conditions of statehood and not 
therefore prior to it. As the PA is not a state, it is not therefore possible to achieve 
democracy. For this reason, President Arafat justified his refusal to endorse a BL for the 
PA (cited in: Milhem 2006, 141).  
 Others have expressed serious doubts for possibility to achieve democracy under 
occupation; however, they fully support the need to subordinate the PA to law (Khalil 
2005c). This is the reason why they may support the adoption of the BL but categorically 
refuse a constitution before statehood is achieved (Samara 2003, 11).  
 For the last group, the transition to democracy does not need to wait for statehood; it can 
accompany the liberation process and democracy can be achieved under conditions of 
occupation. Furthermore, it can contribute to ending the occupation (Hasan 2003, 84).  
 
The PA has been criticized for the system it presides over in the territory under its control, as 
reflected in the BL; indeed for some authors, the proposed BL seems likely to impose the old 
regime of the PLO onto the new (post Oslo) politics of the oPt. Since its establishment, fear 
has been raised that decades of struggle against the Israeli occupation may have to be 
redirected against the new PA for its undemocratic performance. Some authors have criticized 
the reference in early versions of the BL to the revolutionary PLO and see this provision as 
giving the PLO decision-making authority over constitutional concerns including human 
rights (Aruri AND Carol 1994, 16).  
 
In Palestinian discourse and writing, references to the principle of the ‘separation of powers’ 
do not necessarily reflect the concept as it is traditionally understood i.e. separation between 
the three branches of government (legislative, executive and judiciary), their reciprocal 
control and collaboration. Indeed, when Palestinians refer to the ‘separation of powers’ they 
may be referring to a number of different issues relevant to the Palestinian political context: 
 
a. Separation of the PLO from PA institutions;  
b. Separation as checks and balances between the legislative, executive, and judiciary; 
c. Separation between the Presidency and the Cabinet; 
d. Separation between the public and the private spheres.12 
  
It should be noted that the distinction between constituent power (the power to frame or 
amend the constitution) and constituted powers (the legislative, judiciary and executive) is 
(almost) absent from Palestinian thinking (as an exception, see Khalil 2006). The adoption of 
the BL and possible amendments shows that constitutional change was not different from any 
other law-making and changing acts (unless by the majority needed). On the contrary, the 
DPC provides for constitutional amendment through referendum (albeit not obligatory), 
thereby distinguishing it from the amendment of other laws.  
                                                
12  eSS Annex 1 of this report. 
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A. Separation of the PLO from PA institutions 
 
Since the early nineties, there has been a consensus regarding the potential impact of the 
establishment of the PA on the PLO; namely that the PA is not intended to, did not (Shikaki 
1997, 60) and shall not (Nofal 1997, 83,) replace the PLO as the sole legitimate representative 
(political entity and institution) of the Palestinian people both in the oPt and the Diaspora. 
However, despite the absence of discourse calling for the replacement of the PLO by PA 
institutions, certain facts on the ground suggest that the Palestinian leadership (regardless of 
their intentions) has taken the PA in this direction, as outlined below (Nofal 1997, 89; 
Kubba'a 1997, 73).  
 
1) The PA challenges the PLO 
 
The PLO - its role, status and relation to the PA and future state - was already at the centre of 
debate both during and immediately after the Declaration of Principles, and successive 
agreements that gave birth to the PA were signed. Authors started to consider the impact of 
these agreements and their authority on the PLO, describing the issue variously as a 
‘crossroads’, the ‘challenge ahead’ or simply as a dilemma (Andoni 1991, Jamil 1993, Khalidi 
A. 1997, Jarbawi 1996).  
 
The establishment of the PA did contribute to the regression of an already fragile PLO and its 
(limited) democratic processes (Okal 2005, 13). The discussions, however, were not about 
whether to maintain or dismantle the PLO. On the contrary, many authors expressed a need to 
reconstruct the PLO for a variety of reasons: to boost the Palestinian position in negotiations 
with Israel; to give impetus to the building of civil society institutions; and to create the 
necessary infrastructure for an independent state including encouraging independent 
economic development (Hilal 2003).  
 
However, four main trends have begun to take shape in the emerging system created in the 
oPt following the signing of the Oslo Accords: 1) a shift in the center of Palestinian political 
life from ‘outside’ (i.e. abroad) to the oPt itself; 2) a growing conflict between the formulas 
governing Palestinian politics in exile and those appropriate to the ‘new’ situation inside the 
oPt; 3) a shift in the goal of demanding the right to a state on all of historic Palestine to the 
more ‘modest’ goal of recovering territory occupied by the Israelis since 1967; and 4) the end 
of the ‘revolutionary’ stage of the national liberation struggle and the political structures that 
accompanied it (Jarbawi 1996).  
 
Some authors have compared the relationship between the ‘inside’ Palestinians and the 
Diaspora (and thus between the PA and the PLO) to other experiences such as the relationship 
between the pre-state Jewish Agency and the State of Israel; the objective here being to 
encourage efforts between all Palestinians to realize their common objectives (Kubba'a 1997, 
80). Others have recognized this possibility but only after the establishment of a Palestinian 
state (Nofal 1997, 87). In this sense, the PLO would not exhaust its role after the 
establishment of the state; rather its role would necessarily need to be adapted in accordance 
to the new reality.  
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2) Comparing the "Council"
13
 and the PLO system 
 
Interestingly, few comparisons have been made between the Palestine National Council-
Executive Committee relationship, as determined through the PLO Basic System (Nezam 
Assasse) and the PLC-PA Executive Authority relationship as outlined in the BL. Similarly, 
few researchers have outlined the similarities in the way that the PLO and Oslo-envisaged 
Council separate power between the legislative and executive branches of government.  
 
According to Article 7 of the PLO Basic System, the PNC is the PLO’s highest authority, 
responsible for establishing policies, plans and programmes (Attannani 2003). While the 
Executive Committee (EC) is elected by PNC members (Article 13), its President is elected 
by the EC itself. This is a system, theoretically, in which the PNC (a parliament-like 
institution) has primacy over the EC.  
 
According to Article III of the Interim Agreement of 1995 (Oslo II), the Council of the 
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (PA) is composed of the Palestinian Council 
and the Ra'ees (Head) of the Executive Authority ("The Council shall possess both legislative 
power and executive power"). According to the same Article, the "Council shall be 
responsible under its executive powers for the offices, services and departments transferred to 
it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate bodies, as necessary 
for the fulfillment of its responsibilities".  
 
One may note that Oslo’s image of the PA is closer to the PLO system than the PA that 
actually resulted from the Oslo Accords. If compared to other state systems, the PLO Basic 
System and PA system as envisaged in Oslo II are similar to the Council System of 
Switzerland in which the legislative power has primacy over the executive power. This 
contrasts with more well-known systems such as the presidential or parliamentary system 
where the separation of powers is either more favourable of the executive (presidential) or 
where the powers must exist in an equilibrium (parliamentary).  
 
This theoretical similarity may suggest that the Oslo agreements could have created a PA 
structure similar to the PLO. With such a PA being democratically elected, it would gain 
popular legitimacy, would localize the Palestinian cause (increasingly delimited to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip) and could eventually replace the PLO.  
 
3) The PA legitimized by PLO mandate  
 
After analyzing the original documents of the PA and the PLO, it becomes clear that the PA is 
not intended to substitute the PLO unless, and until, all the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people have been realized (Al-Khalidi 1997, 49). The PLO remains the reference point for the 
PA. Indeed, it was possible to establish the PA because of agreements made between the PLO 
(recognized by the Israeli authorities as the representative of the Palestinian people) and the 
Government of Israel (Kubba'a 1997, 73). The formation of the PA itself was agreed at a 
meeting of the PLO Central Council (hereinafter PLO CC) in Tunisia on 10-12th October 
1993 (Nofal 1997, 85). The resolution entitled the PLO Executive Committee (hereinafter the 
PLO-EC) to form the PA Council and nominated the Chairman of the PLO-EC (Yasser Arafat 
at the time) as President of the PA Council.  
 
It is interesting to note that the above resolution enabled the PLO-EC to choose the members 
of the PA Council, both from its own membership and others (either from ‘inside’ the oPt 
(West Bank and Gaza Strip) or ‘outside’ (in the Diaspora). This indirectly led to a potential 
                                                
13 Oslo Agreements referred to the "Council" as the elected body to which all transferred authorities 
shall be exercised. For more details, see paragraphs below.  
 13 
overlapping of functions between PLO and PA institutions. The PA Election Law of 1995 and 
the new Election Law of 2005 did not impose any limitation on the participation of PLO 
personnel in either PLC or Presidential elections. This meant that a person could be both a 
member of the PLO-EC (thus a member of the PNC as PLO-EC members are chosen from 
PNC members) and the PA Council, and after the 1996 elections, a member of the PLC. This 
potential duplication of functions has had a negative impact on the accountability of PA 
personnel (Shikaki 1997, 61). This is particularly true for the position of the PA President as 
in current practice he is directly elected to the position of PA president while at the same time 
acting as the Chairperson of the PLO-EC (Kubba'a 1997, 77).
14
  
 
It should be noted that there was a discussion within the PLO concerning the composition of 
the PA Council, including a call for the formation of the Council from Palestinians ‘inside’ 
the oPt only. One option explored was the suggestion to rename the Palestinian Authority (as 
defined in the Oslo accords) into the National Authority. Eventually, the majority of the PLO-
EC decided that its members should be able to join the PA-Council (Nofal 1997, 84).  
 
4) The PLO gradually marginalized  
 
Some authors have observed that, de facto, the centre of Palestinian political gravity has 
shifted away from the PLO towards the PA (Nofal 1997, 86; Khalil 2005c). In this sense, the 
PA increasingly plays the role of ‘state in waiting’ thus influencing and shaping the 
Palestinian political system and institutions (Sayigh 1997, 63). The PLO presence has become 
increasingly symbolic (Hilal 1997, 98) as a political convenience to be utilized as required 
(Al-Hasan 2006, 38) and whose role is limited to the signing of agreements on behalf of, and 
for the benefit of the PA (Khaled 2005).  
 
It should also be noted that there is a generalized tendency within the international community 
to conduct business with the PA rather than with the PLO; the most relevant example was the 
presentation of the Road Map peace plan by the Quartet to the PA Prime Minister (Attannani 
2003).  
 
This is viewed with suspicion and considered almost as a conspiracy by some (Kubba'a 1997, 
68, 73) while others see the PA’s increasing centrality as a natural phenomena commensurate 
with its (limited) territorial jurisdiction and administration of those Palestinians living in the 
oPt. For others, however, the objectives of the PLO will not necessarily be exhausted with the 
establishment of a state. It is not conceivable then to envisage the dissolution of the PLO prior 
to statehood and resolution of all outstanding issues, mainly the question of refugees (Sayigh 
1997, 67).  
 
The transference of most of the PLO institutions and leadership to the territory under PA 
control initiated the gradual marginalization of PLO institutions as key departments, such as 
the PLO Political Department, remained outside the oPt. For some authors, this process is 
irreversible (Shbeib 1997, 54-55) and the PLO will never recuperate its initial role (Sayigh 
1997, 66).  
 
At the same time, the transition has inevitably been made away from the direction of a 
national liberation struggle and towards the process of state-building to include the 
administration of the population of the oPt. The Palestinian cause, which once centered on the 
rights of the entire Palestinian nation (including a geographically dispersed Diaspora) to self-
                                                
14 If PNC members can be candidates in the PLC elections, and if PLC deputies, once elected, can 
become members of the PNC, it is possible to conclude that some individuals may be members of the 
PNC twice, one by nomination to the PNC and one after their election to the PLC. This would suggest 
that the overlap between the PLO and PA was inevitable and that the principle of the separation of 
powers has been undermined (Kubba'a 1997, 76). 
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determination, has increasingly been reduced to the question of autonomy and sovereignty 
over a limited territory and Palestinian population (Khalil 2005c). This is perhaps what Azmi 
Bishara (2007) calls the ‘privatization of the Palestinian cause’ which has marginalized the 
rights of the refugees. 
 
To some however, the role of PLO remains crucial while its reconstruction and reform will 
guarantee the realization of national objectives (Khaled 2005). More than a decade after the 
establishment of the PA, the future of the PLO remains unresolved. Despite this, discussions 
are ongoing in public and although the DPC does not seem to provide a coherent solution, the 
role of the PLO was discussed in talks on forming a National Unity Government following 
the second legislative elections and subsequent victory of Hamas (Attannani 2006).  
 
For Abrash (2006b, 43-45) the arrival of Hamas in power has consequences not only for the 
separation of powers within the PA itself but also for the Palestinian political system as a 
whole and in particular on the representativeness of the PA. In other words, the participation 
of Hamas (who are not members of the PLO) in the PA elections gives the PA institutions an 
increasingly representative role. For the same author, Hamas has always presented itself as an 
alternative representative of the Palestinian people, being a religious-motivated group rather 
than a nationalistic-secular PLO. The reconstruction of the PLO to potentially include 
religious parties such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad would primarily resolve the question of the 
‘secularism’ of the PLO (which the two Islamic groups categorically oppose) in addition to 
resolving the question of quotas for these groups in the PNC (Qasem 2004, 15). 
 
On the other hand, the refusal of the PLO-EC to endorse the program of Hamas Prime 
Minister Ismael Haneyyeh's first Government reignited discussion at the highest levels on the 
relationship between the PA and the PLO. The PLO-EC further criticized the lack of 
reference to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (Abrash 
2004b, 50).  
 
5) The PLO-PA Conflicting Domains 
 
The eminent analyst, Khalil Shikaki (1997, 61) as early as 1997 suggested two areas of 
possible conflict between the PLO and PA: First, the ‘ratification’ of treaties, such as the 
‘Hebron Protocol’ of 1997, which the PLC asked to review but was refused by President 
Arafat who determined that it was a matter for the PLO; and second, the drafting of a 
‘nationality’ law, which would have inevitable repercussions on the Diaspora (Khalil 2007) 
despite the fact that the Charter had already attempted to define who is a Palestinian. 
However, the participation of (West Bank & Gaza Strip) refugees in the legislative, 
Presidential and municipal elections (thus treating them effectively as ‘citizens’) should not 
be interpreted as a renunciation of their right to return (Jarrar 1998).  
 
Several other examples can be presented concerning possible conflicts between the PLO and 
the PA:  
 
First, the BL reference to the PLO 
In earlier drafts of the BL, there was only one Article in the last chapter (Al-Haq 1996, 74) in 
which it is stated that the endorsement of a BL shall not undermine any of the PLO powers, 
mainly with respect to diplomatic representation, which some authors have criticized (Shikaki 
1997, 60). This article, however, was canceled when reviewed by the legal committee of the 
newly elected PLC. The BL adopted by the PLC in 1997, and endorsed by the President in 
2002, did refer to the PLO but only in its introduction in which it is stated that the PLO is the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Another example is the fact that the 
PA President delivers his/her oath of office in front of, inter alia, the PNC speaker (article 
35). This issue was regulated earlier by Presidential Decree no. 1 of 1996.  
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Second, the endorsement of the PA laws 
All laws are endorsed by the PA President although he always signs as Chairman of the PLO-
EC in addition to his function as the elected PA President. So if the two functions can be 
distinguished in practice, then it is theoretically possible to have the two functions covered by 
two different people in the future. In which case, only the signature of the PA President would 
be needed for the adoption of laws.  
 
Third, the prior approval of the PLO EC of the Elections Law 
Elections Law no.13 of 1995 was adopted "after the approval of the PLO-EC, in the presence 
of the Presidency of the PNC" (check the preamble of the Law). The same procedure was 
applied to the adoption of Law no.16 of 1995, amending the Elections Law no.13 of 1995. 
However, following the election of the first PLC, no prior approval of the PLO-EC was 
sought. This was also the case with the passing of Elections Law no. 9 of 2005 and its 
amendments (Law no.19 of 2005 and Law no.4 of 2006). On the contrary, a new phrase was 
inserted into the text: "In the Name of the Arab Palestinian People". This suggests that the 
PLC, as an elected institution, carries the necessary legitimacy to approve laws. This vision is 
reflected in legislative procedures that are codified in the BL and the PLC by-laws. A 
contrasting position is held by Faruk Al-Kaddoumi, Head of the PLO Political Department, 
who wrote in a letter addressed to Mahmoud Zahhar (Hamas) Minister of Foreign Affairs that 
"..all legislations issued by the Council of Ministers or the PLC shall be endorsed by the PNC 
and the PLO EC before its entrance into force".
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Fourth, the PLC deputies are members of the PNC 
The above mentioned Law no.4 of 2006 which amended Elections Law no. 9 of 2005 is 
interesting because it adds a paragraph to Article 2 in which it is stated that PLC members 
become members of the PNC (Kubba'a 1997, 71). This article was included in the first 
Elections Law but surprisingly disappeared from the second one. This omission was criticized 
by PNC President Salim Zanoun in a letter (2/2/2006) addressed to President Abbas in which 
he suggested that neither the PA nor PLC is ‘competent’ to make this decision as it relates to a 
sovereign decision taken by the Chairman of the PLO-EC prior to the election of the PLC.
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The new Elections Law (no. 4 of 2006) does not provide for PLC members become, ex 
officio, members of the PNC, but rather after taking the oath according to the Basic System of 
the PLO. However, there is nothing in the cited reference concerning the way the oath shall be 
taken.  
 
Fifth, the nomination of delegates to foreign countries 
Article 40 of the BL provides that the President is responsible for the appointment and 
termination of the services of the PA's "delegates to foreign countries, international 
organizations and foreign agencies" and "shall accept the credentials of foreign delegates" to 
the PA. This overlaps with various PLO priorities mainly in the Political Department. In the 
same spirit, the Diplomatic Law no.13 of 2005 was adopted. Previously, two other ministerial 
changes also took place within the PA that strengthened the role of the PA vis a vis the PLO: 
a Minister for Negotiations Affairs was created, and the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation was divided into two separate Ministries thus strengthening the 
position of the PA Minister for Foreign Affairs with respect to the role of the PLO Political 
Department (Attannani 2003). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 The letter was published in Majallat Adderassat Al-Falasteneya, 67, 184.  
16 The letter was published on: http://www.safsaf.org/mot/taamor_ala_majles_watani.htm  
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6) The Consultative Council 
 
The DPC makes reference to a Consultative Council composed of 150 members but with no 
clear provisions as to its competencies or the way in which its members will be nominated or 
elected (as the DPC is not clear on this point). The lack of clarity concerning the process of 
determining its membership has led to confusion regarding the identity and role of the 
Consultative Council (Al-Bargouthi 2004, 40).  
 
Such a body would be established in recognition of the fact that Palestinians in the Diaspora 
needed to be represented in the state institutions without necessarily having a determinant role 
in the legislative process. It should be noted that in early DPC drafts, the Consultative Council 
was the same as the PNC, and thus indirectly referenced the PLO’s most important institution 
(Brown 2003b, 42). This provision was viewed by some as an attempt to replace the PNC (a 
PLO institution) once a Palestinian state exists (Rabah AND Hamam 2004, 225). The 
Constitutional Committee has always denied that this Consultative Council would replace the 
PNC and for this reason, renamed this advisory council from ‘National’ (in the first draft) to 
Consultative Council (in later drafts).  
 
Lingering legitimate doubts concerning the nature of this body persist as the Deputy 
Chairman of the Constitutional Committee (Head of the Drafting Committee, Dr. Ahmad 
Mubarak Al-Khalidi) called for the bi-cameral advisory system to accommodate the 
specificities of the PA-PLO relationship by to ensure the separation of powers between the 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Palestinians (Al-Khalidi 1997, 53).  
 
Some authors however believe that the constitution should not determine or delineate the 
relationship between PA and PLO institutions as the PLO represents all Palestinians (Rabah 
AND Hamam 2004, 225).  
 
 
B. Separation as checks and balances  
 
The separation of powers can never be absolute as the level and degree of that separation 
depends largely on the type of political and legal system in use. Therefore, it could be said 
that there are as many different kinds of ‘separation of powers’ as there are political and legal 
systems. However, for the purposes of this paper, reference will be made to the most widely 
accepted understanding of the concept which refers to the three main powers of the state: the 
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.  
 
The separation of powers should not undermine the unity of the state; on the contrary, it 
encompasses mutual cooperation and control (through the use of so-called checks and 
balances) in order to ensure the continuation and functioning of the state, and the protection of 
citizens from the possibility of corruption and despotism by either one person or a group 
(Nassar 2004, 74). The goal of consolidating a political system based on the separation of 
powers was primary the motivation for drafting a democratic Palestinian constitution 
according to Dr. Nabil Sha'ath, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee (Kayed 2004, 30).  
The constitution is presented as the most appropriate instrument to determine the margin of 
maneuverability of each power towards the others, and towards the citizens (Nassar 2004, 75) 
which essentially converts the issue from the theoretical to one of practical mechanisms and 
procedures. For this reason, Palestinians opted for the adoption of a BL to regulate and 
separate the three main powers although under PA limited jurisdiction.  
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1) Which Political System for Palestine? 
 
When examining the political system in the territory under PA control, there is often 
confusion between what "is" and what it "ought to be". The first instance refers to the existing 
system of institutions and laws (mainly at the constitutional level) while the second refers to 
what may be best for the Palestinians. In this case, analysis is based more on political or 
moral judgments while in the first case, the analysis tends to be more descriptive. 
 
Indeed, the way in which the main powers of state are separated (or not) largely reflects the 
kind of political system that is in operation. A ‘rigid’ separation of powers (i.e. the executive 
and the legislative are independent from each other) would suggest a presidential system, 
while a more flexible system of separation (based on the principle of equilibrium) would 
suggest a parliamentary one. The system adopted in the BL is more Parliamentary (mixed 
with some elements from the Presidential system) because the Executive (excluding the 
President) depends to a large extent on the legislative body for its survival (Al-Rayes and 
Sanyoura 2004, 46).  
 
Interestingly, the DPC defines the Palestinian political system as a ‘parliamentary 
representative democracy’ (Article 8) while the BL defines it as a ‘representative democracy’ 
(Article 5). However, the type of political system (whether Presidential or Parliamentary) 
depends on how the three main powers are organized and how the relationship between each 
of them is regulated. Accordingly, most Palestinian analysts define the Palestinian system 
(according to the BL) as ‘mixed’ (Al-Bargouthi 2004, 20; Al-Khalidi 2004b, 105). It has 
elements of a Parliamentary system mainly in the form of a government that is answerable to 
Parliament (PLC) and a Presidential system whereby the elected President enjoys wide-
ranging executive authority but is not answerable to the PLC.
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Some authors have drawn a comparison with the French system, often called a semi-
Presidential system (Khashan 2004a, 6). However, there are major differences between the 
two systems mainly regarding the Palestinian Presidency of the Council of Ministers and co-
signature procedures in France. Other authors describe the Palestinian political system as 
neither mixed nor Presidential but rather as an anomaly (Aman 2006).  
 
2) Reconsidering the Palestinian Political System 
 
While analyzing the Palestinian political system, authors outlined advantages and 
disadvantages of different political systems (Al-Khalidi 2004a; Khashan 2004a; Abu Dayyeh 
2007; Abu El-Ata 2007; Awad 2007). In the Palestinian context, there appears to be a 
correlation between the nature and form of its actual political system and its efficiency and 
stability (Abu El-Ata 2007, 1). Indeed there are different views on the relative merits of the 
existing (mixed) system, created by the BL and adopted in the DPC (Kayed 2004, 30):  
 
 Some authors are indifferent to which type of system should be adopted for Palestine and 
consider that either of the existing options (Presidential or Parliamentary) is preferential 
to the perceived confusion created by these constitutional texts.  
 Others are critical of the constitutional provisions that grant the President an executive 
role and would therefore prefer to enhance the Parliamentary system (Shikaki AND Harb 
2005; Harb 2004a & 2005). For some, the Parliamentary system is the most appropriate 
system for the Palestinians (Samara, 2003, 12).  
 The third group would prefer to enhance the powers of the President but insist on limiting 
the Presidential mandate to two terms in office (Al-Astal 2000).  
 
                                                
17 For a different position see (Hassan 2004, 5). 
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In all cases, there is almost complete consensus on the need to review the existing mixed 
political system, and that any new system should include better mechanisms of accountability 
and transparency to combat corruption and enhance the overall stability of the political system 
thus positively contribute to state-building (Abu Dayyeh 2007, 5). Furthermore, the 
reconsideration of the Palestinian political system should address the perceived mistrust of the 
Palestinian populace in the existing political system (Hasan 2003, 90).  
 
Study and analysis of the Palestinian political system has acquired a new importance 
following the election of Hamas and consequent need to clarify the rights and duties of 
different institutions and authorities.  
 
3) To Separate Powers, they should exist first! 
 
It seems that the general trend in Palestinian thinking is more towards enhancing the 
‘parliamentary’ characteristics of the political system. However, some have argued that it is 
not worth changing the political system in the current situation as the real problem is not 
related to the type of system that exists now. The problem stems from the historical origins 
and development of the system, in terms of its emergence, leadership, practices and societal 
changes over time. Indeed, any perceived weaknesses in the current system may disappear 
with the establishment of a Palestinian state. But ultimately, the most important point with 
respect to a future Palestinian political system is that it should include a clear and suitable 
mechanism to separate the three main powers and regulate the relationship between them 
(Jarbawi 2007). 
 
Given that PA jurisdiction is limited to only a portion of the Palestinian territory and 
population (Abrash 2006b, 43) many authors have re-directed their discussion to questioning 
the very existence and nature of power in the PA under conditions of occupation and lack of 
sovereignty. They argue that before discussing which political system would be best for a 
future Palestine, the question of whether a system currently exists or not should be answered 
(Jarbawi 2007).  
 
In 2003, the Palestinian political system changed, following international pressure, to 
accommodate an Office of the Prime Minister as a counter-weight to the all powerful Office 
of the President, inhabited at the time by Yasser Arafat. Since the election of Mahmoud 
Abbas as President of the PA, this trend has been somewhat reversed. For example, 
Presidential Decree no. 26 of 2005 concerning the reconstruction of the National Security 
Council or the proposition to amend the BL to include an Office of the Vice President (as 
stated by President Abbas to the PLC on 9 August 2005). Some authors argued that this 
apparent return to a more Presidential style of government meant a return to instability and 
therefore suggested constitutional amendments to limit Presidential authority including that 
the President should not be directly elected but nominated by the PLC (Harb 2004a & 2005; 
Shikaki and Harb 2005). The same authors argued that change should not be based on 
removing powerful personalities (Harb 2004a, 4) but rather on creating a system that reflects 
a comprehensive vision of what is best for the Palestinian people.  
 
4) Emergency Regulations 
 
The BL expressly abrogated the British Emergency Regulations of 1945 (Article 114) and 
instead gave the President the authority to declare a state of emergency under certain 
circumstances and for limited period of time (Article 110-114).  
The DPC also added a further limitation on the President's power to declare a state of 
emergency: He first has to agree with the Prime Minister and also ‘consult’ with the Speaker 
of the Council of Representatives. Some consider this to be a week provision that may 
undermine the possibility for oversight of the initial emergency declaration (Brown 2003b, 
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50-53). For others, the DPC provision is a step towards a more participatory process in the 
declaring of an emergency, one that limits the possibilities of misuse and manipulation by the 
President, despite the fact that declaring the state of emergency remains entirely in the hands 
of the President (Kayed 2004, 32).
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5) The Possibility to Dissolve the Legislative Assembly  
 
The possibility of dissolving the PLC brought out the continuing debate on constitutional law 
issues following the recent call by President Abbas for early elections. As the BL lacked 
appropriate provisions, a number of constitutional issues could only be resolved either by 
referring to other legal documents, by comparison with other legal systems or by referring to 
the DPC. The legitimacy of straying beyond the BL was discussed widely in a rather 
politicized national debate. The main positions taken in this debate can be divided into two 
groups although certain variations of opinion exist within each group:  
 
First, those who believe that the President could not call for early elections 
This group bases its position on the BL which provides for legislative and Presidential 
elections every four years. As the BL does not impart constitutional power to the President to 
dissolve the PLC, he equally has no right to call for early elections.  
 
Second, those who believe that the President could call for early elections 
This group bases its position on a variety of different justifications and explanations, which 
can be seen as either strengths or weaknesses of this position:  
 
1) Justifications based on the BL:  
 There is nothing in the BL that entitles the President to dissolve the PLC, but nothing 
that prohibits him from doing so either. 
 The electorate is the ultimate source of authority and can be called upon to vote in 
times of political instability and uncertainty.  
2) Justifications based on provisions in legal documents other than the BL: 
 The President as PLO chairman can call for early elections;  
 In the absence of a clear reference in the BL, reference can be made to previous 
constitutional texts. For instance, the Palestine Order-in-Council and the Jordanian 
Constitution give this power to the Head of State.  
 The political system created by the BL is a Parliamentary system with an elected 
President who is not formally accountable to the PLC. In Parliamentary systems, the 
separation of powers is not absolute. There is no contradiction per se in giving the 
President the power to dissolve Parliament on condition that it is provided for in the 
constitution or other law.  
 
Other authors made reference to Article 88 in the DPC which gave the right to call early 
elections to the Council of Ministers, at the request of the President or at the request of the 
Prime Minister, promulgated by the President (this right, however, cannot be practiced, 
according to the same article, during the state of emergency). This Article was criticized for 
favouring the executive who may use this authority against the elected legislative council and 
thus potentially negates the need for the Cabinet to account for its actions to parliament 
(Kayed 2004, 33). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 There is on occasion confusion between the ability to declare a state of emergency and the ability to 
create an ‘emergency government’. There is no provision in either the BL or DPC for the latter. 
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C. Separation of the Presidency from the Cabinet 
 
The issue of the separation of powers has been at the centre of internal Palestinian discussions 
not only to clearly define the relationship between the executive, legislative and judiciary but 
also to define and separate the powers within the executive itself: between the elected 
President (not accountable to the PLC) and the appointed Prime Minister and Government 
(accountable to both the President and the PLC (reference: PLC in BL Article 5, or reference: 
Representative Council in Parliament in DPC Article 86). However, in practice, their 
respective roles and responsibilities have generally not been clarified or interpreted according 
to the various laws and constitutional texts when conflict has arisen. The preference, in 
practice has been to resolve all conflicts through ‘fraternal dialogue’ using the same approach 
of the National Agreement Document drafted by a group of Palestinian prisoners in 2007.
19
  
 
1) Separation as Cohabitation  
 
The issue of the separation of powers between the President and the Prime Minister has been 
at the center of debate since the amendment of the BL in 2003 which created the post of 
Prime Minister (Al-Khalidi 2004a; Khashan 2004a). Following the death of President Arafat, 
several authors started to talk about a new era in terms of moving from a period of 
‘charismatic leadership’ to a more institutionalized authority (Safieh 2004; Khalil 2005c). 
Here reference can be made to Max Weber’s three types of authority: traditional authority, 
charismatic authority and rational legal authority based on law (Jarbawi 2006, 87). 
 
However, the issue of the division of powers between the President and the Prime Minister 
gained prominence following the second legislative election that brought Hamas to power and 
the President's party (Fatah) into a minority for the first time (Abu Dayyeh 2007; Abu El-Ata 
2007). The so-called cohabitation between the two parties within PA institutions has not 
proved easy and the existing constitutional texts have not always been helpful in this regard 
(Aman 2006).  
 
All commentators are clear about the provisions in Articles 38 and 63 of the BL concerning 
the exercise of Presidential executive authority. However, the office of the PA President 
currently has certain competencies normally assigned to a head of state. The problem is that 
the BL makes no mention of these, or provides for mechanisms of control over the President’s 
exercise of these competencies (Khalidi 2004a, 5). The DPC is more explicit on this point.
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2) Separation of Powers as Partition of Gains  
 
Following the ‘Mecca Agreement’ in 2007,21 the main Palestinian political factions agreed to 
resolve their political differences by establishing a Government of National Unity, essentially 
a quasi-tribal arrangement between factions based on repartition of the public sphere between 
political factions. This solution is considered by some to be technically outside of the law 
and/or existing constitutional arrangements.  
 
                                                
19 The document was produced by Palestinian prisoners representing all Palestinian factions; it 
proposes principles intended to be basis of unity between Palestinian factions. The document was 
published in Majallat Adderassat Al-Falasteneya, 67, 186-198. 
20 More details are provided in Annex 4 concerning the President's prerogatives vs. the Prime Minister, 
Cabinet, and PLC. 
21 Based on the initiative announced by Saudi King Abdullah Ben Abdul Aziz, Fatah and Hamas 
Movements held in the period February 6-8, 2007 in Mecca the dialogues of Palestinian conciliation 
and agreement. This agreement has took the name of "Mecca Agreement".  
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While a separation of powers, or repartition, between the President and Government is sought, 
the DPC and the BL do not articulate such a separation of powers, and therefore arrangements 
negotiated outside the constitutional framework will be necessary unless such arrangements 
can be duly codified and adopted into existing constitutional documents.  
 
For some authors, the constitutional arrangements of the BL and PA legal system in general, 
create a system that serves the party in power in which any gains become its ‘personal’ 
property (Jarbawi 2007). Similarly, it has been observed that Palestinian political culture is 
somewhat ‘personalised’ in the sense that loyalty is directed to the leader and party that 
dominates (Hasan 2003, 89).  
 
The repartition or division of powers is often undertaken for reasons of ‘national interest’ 
although in practice, priorities are often determined by party political or even personal 
interests (Jarbawi 2007). Thus, there have been calls to distinguish between political and 
administrative actions (Jarbawi 2007). The same applies to the security forces. No political 
party, in principle, rejects the need to de-politicize the security forces. However, de-
politicization in a Palestinian context is often confused with meaning the increased 
participation of members of the new party in power, thus moving from a one-party system to 
a two-party system. For Abrash (2006b, 47), Hamas agreed to participate in national elections 
in order to participate in the decision making process and to share the political gains. For 
Giacaman (2006, 54), the inclusion of Hamas in the Palestinian political system will 
inevitably bind it to past and future PA action and decisions as the PA’s origin of legitimacy 
is based on popular elections. 
 
 
D. Separation of the public from the private sphere 
 
Civil society in Palestine has historically played a prominent role, most especially since the 
beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. Civil society was well established and could not 
be ignored at the time that the PA was created. PA institutions have to deal with and take into 
account the various civil society structures that exist on the ground but often find that they 
compete for the same resources or control over public services that should be provided 
through state institutions. In this sense, the discussion on the separation of powers ended up 
sometimes by considering the delicate issue of separating public from private interest. The 
separation here does not mean that civil society is not entitled to pursuit public interests but 
rather that state institutions shall have central role in public affairs. 
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3. The Legislative process and Enforcing  
 
A. The Legislative process  
 
The legislative process
22
 involves three phases: 
 
1. Preparing the draft law: this includes the preparation of policy and drafting the proposed 
law;  
2. Discussing the draft-law: this includes the so-called "general discussion", followed by two 
(or three) different votes;  
3. Endorsement of the law: this includes the signature of the President (or the amendments 
he proposes), publication in the Official Journal and its execution through by-laws.  
 
The actors and skills needed for each phase are various.
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Until the adoption of the BL in 2002 (see Annex 2 for procedures), the legislative process was 
completely regulated by Law no. 4 of 1995.  
 
The procedures gave complete control to the executive (mainly the President) over the 
legislative process. The President's role in the legislative process was in accordance with the 
Oslo Accords which state that the President shall not enact laws in contradiction to 
agreements between Israel and the PLO. The ‘veto right’ of the President was the object of 
criticism by several local and human rights organizations.
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Following the first elections of the PLC in 1996, the new legislative actor (PLC) replaced the 
Council of the PA in the process created by the Law mentioned above. The By-Law of the 
PLC, adopted in 2000, regulated internal procedures at the PLC.  
 
Following the adoption of the BL in 2002, the legislative process went through a 
revolutionary change, one which was highly appreciated by those struggling for the rule of 
law. In theory, the PLC could bypass the President's refusal to endorse the Law according to 
Article 57 (and following amendments in 2003, Article 41): “The President of the National 
Authority shall promulgate laws after being ratified by the Palestinian Legislative Council 
within thirty days from referring them to him…”. In other words, the PLC now had all the 
legal instruments to bypass any possible Presidential disapproval of its legislation. Although it 
did enhance PLC legislative activity, certain facts on the ground show that that the Article 
was not duly used or activated. In fact, Raouhi Fattouh signed most of the pending laws when 
he held the Office of President ad interim after the death of President Arafat (Al-Rayes 2004, 
61; Abrash 2006a, 88). Since President Abbas has arrived in office, there has been a clear 
tendency to respect legal procedures and time requirements.  
 
1) Anomalies in the Legislative Process  
 
The legal and regulatory framework of the Palestinian legislative process has been the object 
of numerous studies and analyses by experts, some of which have documented the following 
interconnected gaps and limitations (for example: Bkeirat 2005 & 2006; IoL 2007): 
  
                                                
22 Here referring exclusively to procedures regulating Law making process, not secondary legislations.  
23 This is not, however, the main issue here. The Institute of Law at Birzeit University has undertaken 
several studies on the different phases in the process of legislation. For more details, see the table in 
Annex II.  
24 See for example the annual reports of the Palestinian Independent Center for Citizens Rights 
(PICCR) at: http://www.piccr.org/index.htm  
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First, in the preparatory phase: 
 The absence of general legislative policy and planning  
 Unclear regulations on the authority of the Cabinet concerning legislative priorities and 
decisions taken within;  
 
Second, in the discussion phase:  
 The possibility of the PLC speaker holding on to proposed laws without detailing a 
timeframe for presentation and general discussion.  
 The possibility for one or more deputies to present draft laws. There were calls for 
amendments to increase the number of deputies necessary to propose laws.  
 The secondary role of the PLC committees and the possibility of proceeding without 
waiting for their reports;  
 
Third, in the promulgation phase:  
 The unclear legal provisions concerning amendments that may be proposed by the 
President and the way the law is promulgated following the vote of the PLC;  
 The complete control the Executive Branch of government has over the decision to 
publish laws in the Official Journal; on some occasions, the Minister of Justice or the 
Diwan even changed the text before publication (Abu Dayyeh 2007, 3).  
 The absence of strategic planning or (in some instances) political will needed to adopt the 
necessary by-laws required to enact the laws. In practice, the Government has the power 
to block the execution of several laws simply by not doing anything (Abu Dayyeh 2007, 
3).  
 
2) Legislation is not just a technical issue  
 
Legislation should not be limited to being technical issue left only to jurists and religious 
experts; nor should its substance be left for politicians alone to decide upon. On the contrary, 
it is a process that expresses the spirit of a society, including its contradictions and 
homogeneity. Legislation is a process of debate, agreement and disagreement between 
different interest groups who use their resources to impose their vision or to influence the 
decision makers (Said 2004b, 13).  
 
Any legal reform should take into consideration Palestinian social relations which in various 
forms are based on three sets of ‘laws’: the formal state or civil laws; the unwritten customary 
laws; and the religious laws (shari'a) that govern so-called personal status issues (Abdo 1999, 
43).  
 
There is no doubt that legislation should take in consideration the particularities of the 
Palestinian case. However, the Palestinian experience, although unique, should not consider 
itself isolated from universal and/or other regional experiences and contexts; on the contrary, 
many authors believe that they overlap (Said 2004b). For this reason, legislation should 
reflect and respect the plurality of Palestinian experience:  
 
 Laws should not be imposed or based on exclusion but on citizens' equality in front of the 
law.  
 Laws should not be seen to be an imposition of the will of the majority on religious or 
political minorities. 
 Laws should take into consideration any positive contributions from the rest of the world, 
including religious traditions, on condition that they be used solely for the benefit of 
Palestinians and based on humanistic principles.  
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The above position opposes refusal of possibility of exchange, influence or impact between 
nations and cultures in the name of cultural particularity. However, this vision of the law that 
‘should be’ often contradicts with what the law actually ‘is’.  
 
3) The Executive's Legislative Powers 
 
The BL ensures a determinant legislative role for the President by enabling him to adopt 
decree-laws under certain circumstances and giving him power to endorse or return a draft 
law to the PLC. These legal and constitutional provisions have been interpreted in a variety of 
ways resulting in differing conceptions of the extent of the President’s legislative powers and 
the procedures needed to ensure that Presidential functioning remains within the law. 
Moreover, additional powers assigned to the executive authority such as whether or not to 
publish new laws in the official journal or the ability to adopt by-laws deemed necessary for 
the enforcement of existing laws, create further ambiguities (Abu Dayyeh 2007, 2).  
 
 
B. Law enforcement  
 
1) The Independence of the Judiciary 
 
The independence of the judiciary had been much debated. It is significant to note that the 
Judiciary Law, as much as the BL itself, was one of the five laws endorsed by President 
Arafat in 2002, after years of abstention. The principle of the independence of the Judiciary is 
ensured in the BL (see Annex 3 and 4) and in the Judiciary Law. This independence refers to 
the institution, which means the independence of the judicial power from the other two 
powers and also the independence of the judges themselves (Abu Sharara AND Khashan 
2004a, 1).  
 
In 2005, an amended Judiciary Law no. 15 was adopted and endorsed by the President. The 
High Court in Gaza, acting as a Constitutional Court, for the first time in Palestinian history 
declared this Law unconstitutional. Most of the amendments included in the Law were 
adopted by decree-law no.2 of 2006, less than twenty days before the legislative elections, 
thus creating a controversial situation. The Decree Law effectively gave enormous power to 
the High Judicial Council (hereinafter the HJC) and its President received most of the powers 
that were previously held by the Minister of Justice.
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The independence of the judiciary is intended to protect the judges and the institution from 
possible interference by the executive leading to a more independent judiciary that is 
answerable only to the law. However, some commentators have observed (Azmi Shueibi, in: 
Abu Sharara AND Khashan 2004a, 7) that in the oPt, the independence of the judiciary means 
something quite different: that the judiciary answers only to the President!  
 
Before the agreement on a Government of National Unity in 2007, a draft Judiciary Law was 
prepared and circulated by a group of smaller parties not affiliated to either Hamas or Fatah. 
The PLC is currently reviewing this new draft and if adopted, it will be the first law to be 
ratified since Hamas was voted in to power. This suggests that there is political consensus 
between the two main parties and other smaller parties on the need for an independent and 
functioning judiciary despite their differences over power-sharing. 
 
One impediment towards a professional, independent and functioning judiciary and HJC is 
the territorial fragmentation of the oPt whereby the West Bank including east Jerusalem has 
                                                
25 In 4/5/2006, President Abbas issued decree no.364 of 2006 abrogating, inter alia, decree-law no.2 of 
2006.  
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become increasingly fragmented internally as well as separated from the Gaza Strip (Abu 
Sharara AND Khashan 2004a).  
 
2) The High Judicial Council 
 
President Arafat established the HJC in 2000 by Decree no.29 of 2000. Later on, the Law on 
Formation of the Courts no.5 of 2001 provided some of the competences of this body. The BL 
adopted in 2002 (Article 91 which became Article 100 in the 2003 version) created a HJC and 
provided that the “law shall specify the way it is constituted, its responsibilities and its 
operating rules”. According to the same Article, the HJC should be consulted about draft laws 
relating to the Judicial Authority, including the Public Prosecution.  
 
At the same time, Judiciary Law no.1 of 2002 dedicated the fourth section to the HJC. In his 
Presidential Decree no.11 of 2002, the President considered the previously established HJC as 
a transitional body, as provided for in Judiciary Law 2002 (Article 81). In 2003, the President 
reconstructed the HJC with Presidential Decree no.8 and nominated Issa Abu Sharara as its 
President, replacing Zuheer Sourani. According to Abu Sharar, the last Decree refers to a 
permanent Council, as provided for in the BL and the Judiciary Law, and not a temporary one 
(Abu Sharara AND Khashan 2004a, 3).  
 
3) Duality of Jurisdiction between religious/shari'a and regular courts  
 
One of the salient features of a future Palestinian state will be the inevitable adoption of a 
dual system of jurisdiction consisting of religious (shari'a) courts and civil or regular courts 
therefore ensuring the independence of (recognized) religious communities to adopt 
legislation on so-called personal status issues and have their own courts for this purpose. This 
was one of the important provisions of Decree No. 1 of 1994 that President Arafat issued 
from the PLO in exile in Tunisia concerning the ‘Continuation of the Laws, Regulations and 
Rules Operative in the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) before and since 5 
June 1967’ until it was replaced by unified PA legislation.  
 
This topic has not been central in the discussions held by Palestinian scholars regarding a 
future Palestinian constitutional framework. On the contrary, the independence of religious 
communities in regulating their own personal status issues, and the jurisdiction of their courts 
to decide on cases involving members of their communities, was confirmed by the Article on 
Islam delineating it as the official religion of the state.
26
 In other words, the autonomy of 
religious communities to decide and legislate on personal status issues is considered to be part 
of the solution rather than the problem.  
 
Those who call for the separation of religion and state suggest the adoption of one civil code 
(that also covers personal status issues) for all citizens, including those who profess a religion, 
and to give the civil courts jurisdiction over personal status issues. This minority position is 
based on the assumption of statehood with equal citizenship for all, without discrimination 
based on religion; accordingly, the same laws should apply to all citizens and the same courts 
adjudicate on behalf of all citizens (Al-Deeb 2003). It should be noted, however, that this 
topic has not been extensively discussed or debated and may, on occasion, have been used as 
a counter-argument in the larger debate on religion (Islam) and the state.  
 
The Palestinian women’s movement has been campaigning for the last decade for reform of 
the family law system. Following the Oslo Accords when the prospect of statehood appeared 
realistic, the movement began to focus more closely on the BL (Abdo 1999, 44) and the 
different drafts of the Palestinian constitution. However, calls for reform were not necessarily 
                                                
26 Article 4 of the BL and Article 5 of the DPC.  
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accompanied by a call for the abolition of the distinction between regular and religious 
(shari'a) courts and thus the adoption of a unified civil code that covers personal status issues.  
 
4) High Constitutional Court  
 
The BL calls for the establishment of a High Constitutional Court (hereinafter the HCC) but 
leaves the issue to be determined by a law (Article 103). Until its establishment, the HJC will 
act as the constitutional court. Law no.3 which establishes a HCC was adopted in 2006. The 
Law decided on a centralized ‘judicial’ body, independent from the Judiciary. The discussions 
that followed the adoption of this Law centered on its inherent inconsistency and the role and 
place of the HCC within the Palestinian political and legal system. The DPC, on the other 
hand, had regulated the issue with more specificity leaving fewer details to be defined by a 
law establishing the HCC. In both cases, the HCC risks being overloaded once it is 
established as it is foreseen to adopt all possible mechanisms for judicial review, including of 
all laws adopted prior to creation of the HCC (Milhem 2006, 148). 
 
5) Administrative, Military and Security Courts  
 
The BL permits the establishment of administrative courts by law (Article 102). But until the 
adoption of such a law, the only type of administrative court is the HCJ.  
 
The BL requires that military courts be regulated by ‘special laws’ that limit their role to 
military affairs only (Article 101/2) although there is very little research on this issue. In the 
existing military courts still apply the (PLO) Revolutionary Penal Code and Palestinian 
Revolutionary Criminal Procedures Law issued by PLO in 1979.  
 
In contrast, the State Security Courts (hereinafter the SSC) were formed by Presidential 
Decrees relating to either internal or external security. Unlike the BL, the SSC were criticized 
for applying military legislation to civilian cases. The status of the SSC was unclear between 
2003 and 2004 when they were de facto inactive, and on 27 July 2003, the former Minister of 
Justice issued a written decision abrogating the SSC and passing their cases on to the regular 
civil courts.  
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4. The Administration of Public Finance 
 
Several reports have confirmed the existence of corruption within PA institutions, generally 
defined as the use of public authority or money for personal or partisan gain (Shueibi 2004, 
711). Corruption may take different forms: bribery, nepotism, favoritism or ‘wasta’ (using 
connections), and blackmailing, all of which have a negative impact on the administration of 
public finances (Shueibi 2004, 714). The PLC has recently been involved in crystallizing the 
legal framework for the administration of public finance (Shueibi 2004, 718). However, 
corruption cannot be eradicated through laws only. Corruption in the PA specifically is related 
to a lack of political will and commitment to the principle of the separation of powers, the 
weakness of institutional structures and the oversight role of the PLC, and the overall 
weakness of the Judiciary compounded by the absence of the rule of law (Shueibi 2004, 721). 
The various Palestinian constitutional documents do take into account the seriousness of the 
administration of public finance, especially the budgeting process, by upholding the general 
principles of transparent public administration and outlining mechanisms for the prevention of 
corruption. However, these mechanisms remain open to abuse. In 2002/2003, external 
pressure helped to facilitate an internal movement for reform including calls for greater 
transparency in public financial management and administration.  
 
 
A. The constitutional protection of public finance  
 
1) The constitutional procedure of budgeting process  
 
The various constitutional documents in the oPt concentrate on the budgeting process and its 
vote in the PLC. Both the BL and the third DPC include mechanisms for protection, the most 
important of which are the checks and balances in the budgeting process. In most democratic 
systems, as in the oPt, the initiative for budget preparation is left to the government, while 
Parliament approves or disapproves through a vote. Although it is interesting to note that the 
BL refers to this procedure mainly
 
in chapter five, in the section on the executive (under the 
title Public Finance), while the DPC refers to it in the chapter on legislative powers (under 
the title Parliamentary competence concerning finance laws). This means that in ongoing 
Palestinian debate on this issue, the emphasis has shifted from administrative (i.e. the 
administrative aspects of budget preparation) to legislative control.  
 
In the BL, Articles 61 and 90 describe the procedure for budgeting process. Article 61 gives 
the Government two months before the end of the fiscal year to hand the budget to the PLC. 
Article 90 gives the Government the right to ask the PLC for credit amounting to 1\12 of the 
previous year’s budget in the event that the coming year’s budget will not be ready at the start 
of the new fiscal year. This procedure is not clearly regulated, mainly after the passage of the 
first three months stated in article 4 of the budget law (Harb 2006, 23).  
 
The DPC tackles the same issue but in different way. Article 92 requires that the Government 
submit the budget to the PLC four months before the end of the fiscal year (which is twice the 
period mentioned in the BL). After which time the PLC has five months from the date it 
received the budget to debate it and vote on it. If the budget is still not voted on after this 
period, the President can approve the budget, based on a decision from the Council of 
Ministers. The rule of 1\12 credits also features in the DPC but is more limited (Article 96). 
 
Both the BL and the DPC obliges the Government to submit an annual financial statement to 
the PLC for its approval at the end of each fiscal year (Article 62, BL; Article 97, DPC).  
 
It should be noted that while the DPC recognizes the principle of the unity of treasury 
accounts, it still allows for annexed budgets that cover spending on long term projects (Article 
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91). The BL does not appear to allow this although it does mention ‘annexed budgets’ that the 
PLC is exclusively proficient to vote on, but no more specifications are given. On the other 
hand, the BL explicitly allows the PA to compile a ‘strategic financial reserve’ in the event of 
‘fluctuations and emergency situations’ (Article 91-2) but does not specify who or what can 
decide on such a fund, or how it should be managed.  
 
2) Constitutional principles in managing the Public finance 
 
Both the BL and the DPC have established constitutional principles for managing public 
funds. On the issue of taxes, a tax cannot be imposed without a law (Article 88, BL; Article 
62 & 99 DPC) as they are part of a citizen’s obligations to the state (Article 62, DPC). 
However, the law can decide how to divide the charges progressively according to social 
criteria based on equality (Article 99, DPC) although this is not mentioned in the BL. All 
money raised through tax collection must go to the public treasury. The principle of non-
affectation of tax money is affirmed in Article 91 of the BL and Article 99 of the DPC. All 
spending from the treasury must be accredited by Law. Similarly, the use of natural resources, 
engaging credits for the state, enhancing investments in Palestine by special treatments for 
foreign capital, and the rules of payments of salaries for public agents, and public subventions 
must be determined by law and approved by the PLC (Articles 92, 94, 95, BL; Articles 98 and 
100, DPC). 
 
3) Constitutional mechanisms for protecting public finance 
 
There are two kinds of mechanisms in the current constitutional system in the under PA 
control for protecting public financial resources: 1) by creating formal agencies for the 
purpose of financial accountability; and 2) by instituting systems or rules that obligate 
financial transparency by public institutions.  
 
The BL establishes two agencies: the Palestinian Monetary Authority and the Financial and 
Administrative Control Bureau
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 (hereinafter Bureau), which was created by law no.15/2004, 
replacing the previously established Public Control Authority established by decree 
no.22/1994. The Monetary Authority, which is equivalent to a central bank, has a President 
which is nominated by the President of the PA with accreditation from the PLC (Article 93, 
BL). This guarantees both its independence from any other administrative body as well as its 
independence in decision-making because the nomination is issued from the highest authority 
in the PA which is controlled by the elected PLC.  
 
The Financial and Administrative Control Bureau
 
was created in response to donors' 
accusations of corruption in the PA, and is charged with making reports both annually and/or 
on demand to the PLC and the President of the PA. This body has a constitutional statute in 
the BL in 2002. The President of the Bureau is nominated in the same way as the President of 
the Monetary Authority. Although the Bureau only has the remit to issue reports, it has gained 
the credibility and trust of the public by revealing the loss of public funds outlined in PA 
financial documents in 1997. An investigation was ordered on the basis of this report.  
 
These institutions are not mentioned in the DPC which is important to note considering the 
positive impact they have had in terms of protecting public finances and exposing corruption. 
But what both constitutional documents contain are mechanisms for ensuring transparency in 
public accounting. These documents require deputies, Ministers and the Prime Minister (once 
elected or nominated) to submit a financial disclosure of their total wealth (including family) 
both inside and outside the country to a judicial body such as the HCC (DPC) or the HCJ 
(BL). These documents will remain confidential unless the court concerned authorizes their 
                                                
27 For more information about the Bureau see their official website: http://www.facb.gov.ps/ 
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consultation for investigative purposes (Articles 54 and 80, BL; Articles 108 and 140, DPC). 
The DPC requires the future President of the Palestinian State to also submit a financial 
disclosure (Article 116) but the BL does not.  
 
 
B. Reforming the public administration of money 
 
The question of ‘reform’ (embodied by the Road Map) was at the centre of debate, both 
internally and externally, in the late 1990’s and early 2000 regarding the issue of Palestinian 
public administration and financing. In return for external political and financial assistance, 
the PA was encouraged to implement certain reforms in the areas of financial accountability 
and transparency. Initial calls for reform however had come from the PLC and Palestinian 
civil society, both of which continue to play a key role in this regard, although their respective 
motivations may differ.  
 
One key area for reform on which there is national consensus is the administration of public 
finances although there is no agreement on the method or the approach (Khaled 2005). It 
should be noted however that the basic principles governing public institutions and assets and 
the redistribution of public finance occupied little space in the overall debate that 
accompanied the adoption of the BL and preparation of the DPC.  
 
In fact, endorsement of the BL in 2002 ran parallel to the reform process. Many steps have 
been taken towards achieving greater accountability and transparency in the public financial 
sector (Kdah' 2003) but more still needs to be done (Harb 2004b).  
 
The authors Abdelkarim and Abu Humos (2006, 46-47) noted the following reform efforts 
undertaken in the area of financial accountability and transparency during the period June 
2002 to July 2003: 
  
 Revenue consolidation: The consolidation of all PA revenue into a Single Treasury 
Account (hereinafter the STA), the transfer of income from PA commercial activities into 
the STA, the consolidation of all PA commercial activities into the Palestinian Investment 
Fund (hereinafter the PIF), and the valuation of its assets and a transparency assessment. 
 Tax administration: Steps toward the unification of tax administration and computer 
systems in the oPt; technical assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund 
(hereinafter the IMF) and European Union (hereinafter the EU); and revising the Income 
Tax Law based on international best practice. 
 Strengthening expenditure controls: Consolidation of expenditure management in the 
oPt; establishing a modern Internal Auditing Department; moving from cash payments to 
direct bank account deposits for security personnel salaries; strengthening external 
auditing procedures through the drafting of a new External Auditing Law by the PLC to 
ensure full independence of the department; submission of regular auditing reports to the 
PLC and comprehensive coverage of all PA institutions; establishing an independent 
procurement agency within the MoF. 
 Limits on PA employment expansion: Strict adherence to additional civil service 
positions as specified in the budget; enforcement of budgetary appropriation limits on 
increases in security personnel; enforcing retirement of civil servants at the age of 60.  
 Budget reform: Design of fully financed and balanced 2003 budget based on realistic 
assumptions; repayment of arrears to private sector; enhancing transparency by meeting 
the budget calendar and publishing all budgetary accounts. 
 Pension reform: Steps taken toward unifying the pension system and the inclusion of 
security personnel under pension coverage; resumption of transfers of civil servant and 
Government contributions to the pension fund in 2003. 
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 Restructuring monopolies: MoF to takeover the Petroleum Authority to ensure greater 
transparency and accountability and to restore market shares and tax revenues; 
restructuring pricing policy for cement and petroleum products in favor of consumers by 
eliminating monopolistic rents. 
 
It should be noted that most of the achievements in the financial sector are in line with the 
financial reform plan adopted by the Council of Ministers in June 2002 (Kdah' 2003). Further 
achievements in the financial reform process have been outlined by authors such as Harb 
(2004b, 8-12) and mainly in the following areas: improved relationship between the Ministry 
of Finance (hereinafter MoF) and the PLC; clarification of financial procedures; restructuring 
of the MoF, re-organization of PA investments, application of procedures provided for in 
Budget Law no.7 of 1998, and the effective application of several adopted laws.  
 
Other reforms were deemed to require more time because of their complexity and scope, as 
well as the need for new legislation such as the re-drafting of a new Income Tax Law; the 
unification of the pension system; civil service reform; the achievement of a fully operational 
internal and external audit system; and enhancement of financial accountability vis-à-vis the 
budget of the Office of the President (Abdelkarim and Abu Humos 2006, 47).  
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5. Secular / Religious Orientations of the State 
 
According to the BL and DPC, the principles of shari’a (Islamic law), are a primary source of 
legislation in Palestine. Indeed, Islam is the official state religion and for that reason, shari’a 
principles should be considered as one of the most important legal foundations of the state-in-
waiting.
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 It should be noted that earlier drafts of the BL made no mention of Islam as being 
the ‘official religion of Palestine’; not until the 7th draft BL was it mentioned.29  
 
The PLO, and Fatah (its main faction) has always been a secular organization. Therefore its’ 
various declarations and discourses are necessarily oriented towards the establishment of a 
secular and democratic state, for example: Yasser Arafat’s speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly on the 13th November 1974. The Charter (1964 and 1968) and the 
Declaration of Independence (1988) are also based on the assumption of a secular Palestinian 
state. However, these declarations were not intended to be anti-clerical or anti-religion, rather 
they all include provisions that recognise the religious heritage of the Palestinian people and 
its importance to believers of all three monotheistic religions. On the contrary, as the 
Declaration states: "Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and 
non-discrimination in the public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, religion, color 
or sex, and the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent 
judiciary". 
 
The emergence of political Islam, and increasing prominence of Hamas in the social (through 
charity work) and political (through elections) spheres since the first Intifada has led to a 
reconsideration of the role of religion in politics in general, and in public affairs in particular. 
Indeed, several indicators (opinion polls for example), would suggest that attachment to Islam 
is on the increase. However, references to Islam or shari'a (or its absence) in the DPC may be 
misleading as to the extent of a possible ‘Islamisation’ of Palestinian society and state (Khalil 
2006b, 271; Suleiman 2005, 14).  
 
The issue of the role of religion in society, and the relationship between Islam and the state in 
particular, was one of the main topics debated in relation to the drafting of the BL and 
publication of the three DPC. The final version of the BL, promulgated by the President and 
the DPC, makes reference to Islam as the official religion of state and shari'a as a (not the) 
source of legislation.  
 
The reference to Islam in the BL and DPC is at the center of the debate on the role of religion 
in the Palestinian constitutional system. However, it should be noted that this debate was not 
conducted on a nationwide basis or inclusive of all sections of society but rather limited to a 
minority Palestinian elite (Suleiman 2005, 27). The debate further showed variations of 
opinion from region to region (Kayed 2004, 9). International observers were also of the 
opinion that a future Palestinian state should seek to protect its minorities within a secular 
constitutional framework.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 This section does not examine all existing literature on the topic of religion and state, neither does it 
cover all discussions on the existing religious or secular orientation of the PA and a future Palestinian 
state. This chapter presents only some of the discussions on Islam and shari'a that preceeded the 
drafting of the BL and DPC.  
29  Drafted by the Legal Committee of the PLC, 9 July 1996 and circulated to the public.  
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A. Islam as official Religion 
 
The constitutional reference to Islam is not exclusive to the Palestinian case as comparable 
studies have shown that many neighboring countries also make the same reference. Indeed, 
when analyzing the potential impact on Palestinian society, a number of Palestinian authors 
concluded that the Palestinian constitutional system should not be disconnected from its 
regional environment (Khalil 2006b, 271) given the historical attachment of middle-eastern 
society to religion in general, and the fact that the majority of the population is Muslim 
(Ahmad 2000).  
 
The various constitutions of neighboring Arab countries make reference to Islam in a number 
of different ways, for instance: Islam is the official religion; Islam is the religion of the state; 
or Islam is the religion of the majority of the people in the state. All possible options therefore 
were presented to the drafters of the BL and DPC. However, the BL (contrary to its first draft 
prepared in early 1990s) and the DPC refer to Islam as the ‘official religion’ in Palestine 
Article 4 of the BL and Article 5 of the DPC). In the same Articles it states that the other 
monotheistic religions (Christianity and Judaism) should have their sanctity respected. This 
reference however does not necessarily assume a religious state or indeed a secular state in 
which religion is totally absent from state affairs. In this sense, the Palestinians, as in the case 
of neighbouring Arab states, chose to constitutionally recognise the existence of an Islamic 
majority (Al-Khalidi 2004b, 112).  
 
One group of commentators viewed this reference as an ending of the secularism envisaged 
by the PLO (Abu Fakher 2004) and instead saw the beginning of the ‘Islamisation’ of 
Palestinian society. Others considered the Article to be a reflection of the existing reality or 
welcomed it as recognition of the special status of Islam in the lives of the majority of 
Palestinians. A third group, did not object to the reference to Islam as long as the principle of 
equality between citizens is not undermined on the basis of religion. Accordingly, it can be 
said that in the debate on the constitutional role of Islam, Palestinians can be roughly divided 
into two main groups: those who believe that religion has a role to play in the affairs of state, 
and those who think it should be considered as separate (Ahmad 2000; Kayed 2004, 10-13): 
 
1) Religion (Islam) and state are interlinked  
 
This group can be further divided into two subgroups according to the preferred extent of 
religious influence in state or public affairs:  
 
First, the reference to Islam as ‘official religion’ is sufficient  
This would guarantee, for the majority of the Palestinian people, a national identity that 
directly corresponds to their own personal religious beliefs. This reference therefore carries 
more political than religious significance as it could be construed as the first step towards the 
establishment of an Islamic state in the future. In the interim period, a modern, democratic 
state is preferable on condition that it respects, or at least does not contradict, Islamic 
principles. This position relates to the increase in religiosity in Palestinian society and not 
necessarily to the increase in support for Islamic movements.  
 
Second, the reference to Islam as ‘official religion’ is good but not enough 
Here, a constitutional provision states that the Head of State and the Prime Minister should be 
Muslims based on the belief that a non-Muslim would not sufficiently protect Islamic 
principles or issue and execute shari'a laws as a (or the) principle source of legislation (The 
Imams of Tulkarem and Qalqilya, cited in Kayed 2004, 12). 
 
2) Religion and state shall be separated  
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According to this position, all references to Islam in the constitutional text should be removed 
(Al-Ali 2004). However, different authors (Al-Deeb 2003, Al-Bargouthi 2004, 21, 36; Abu 
Fakhr 2004; Al-Hawaree 2004; DSP 2004, 156) have different reasons for their position:  
 
 Reference to an official religion contradicts the principle of equality in a country that is 
willing to treat all its citizens equally and without discrimination including on the basis of 
religion.  
 Palestinian society is already mindful of the importance of having a modern democratic 
political system based on the equality of all citizens.  
 It contradicts the principle of the rule of law, as enshrined in the constitution, which is 
designed to safeguard the individual against arbitrary governance.  
 It may be misused by fundamentalist groups to justify actions that discriminate against 
non-Muslims.  
 The state, as a sovereign political entity, has no religion. It rises above religious beliefs or 
either an individual or group.  
 Reference to Palestine as an Islamist state may be considered justification for Israel to 
declare itself a Jewish state which could have negative consequences for the Israeli Arab 
population.  
 Most modern constitutions make no reference to an official religion but rather refer to the 
state as a secular state. Palestine should strive to be a modern state.  
 
 
B. Constitutional Reference to Shari'a  
 
The BL and the DPC adopt the same reference to shari'a: ‘(the) principles of Islamic shari'a 
are a primary source of legislation’ which means that the law can have other sources but uses 
shari'a as a reference (Kayed 2004, 13). From this position, two main groups of thought can 
be identified:  
 
1) The Constitution shall refer to shari'a  
 
For this group, although shari'a will be a primary source of legislation, respect for other 
monotheistic religions will be guaranteed in accordance with the traditions of Palestinian 
society. Within this group however there are three different sub-groups, each with a different 
opinion as to what constitutes a ‘reference’ to shari'a:  
 
First, shari'a as a primary source of legislation is enough 
The current reference to shari'a as a primary source of legislation would be acceptable if 
shari'a enjoys a high level of credibility within Palestinian society, and only if no other laws 
that contradict the spirit of shari'a are adopted. Otherwise a constitutional amendment would 
be needed and requested. For this group, shari'a takes priority even over international law and 
conventions (Nasser Deen Sha'er in: Kayed 2004, 14).
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Second, shari'a should be ‘the’ (not a) principle source of legislation  
In this case, all laws and legislation in the Palestinian state will be taken from shari'a; it being 
inherently a source of social justice and political, economic and social stability.
31
 
Furthermore, these laws would contain articles that contain the phrase "without contradicting 
Islamic shari'a". It is interesting to note that Hamas’ political manifesto for the 2006 elections 
included a proposition to amend Article 4 of the BL, from "a" to "the" principle source of 
legislation.  
                                                
30 This the position taken by Nasser Deen Sha'er, cited in Kayed (2004, 14).  
31 Conference at Dar Al-Fatwa wal Buhouth Islameyya on the Palestinian Constitution (23/7/2003) 
cited in Kayed (2004, 15). 
 34 
 
It should also be noted that the 7
th
 draft of the BL and the first DPC also adopted this position 
which was harshly criticized by the international community. This may have inadvertently 
facilitated internal pressure on the PLC and its Constitutional Committee to amend the Article 
by replacing "the" with "a". These changes were considered to be positive but not sufficient to 
remove the ambiguity regarding the authority of constitutional provisions over shari’a in the 
event of a conflict over the rights or duties of citizens (Khalil 2006b, 272-275).  
 
Third, a shari'a expert should become one of the judges of the Constitutional Court 
For this group, reference to shari'a as ‘a’ or ‘the’ source of legislation will remain ineffective 
in practice if there is no mechanism to review laws that may contradict with shari'a. In other 
words, this group supports a requirement for each law to be reviewed by a constitutional court 
on its reference to shari’a. This group further believes that judges of the constitutional court 
should use shari'a as their reference in all decisions (Kayed 2004, 16).  
 
2) The constitution shall not refer to shari'a 
 
Overall, this group generally agrees on the need to remove the Article that refers to shari'a 
but some would consider amending it to read as follows: "Shari'a principles are one of the 
sources of legislation": i.e. One of many rather than ‘a’ or ‘the’ principle source (Al-Hawaree 
2004, 21). Others would prefer the Article, if not cancelled, to be re-formulated as follows: 
"Human rights principles and monotheistic religious principles which do not contradict those 
rights are a source of legislation" (Al-Deeb 2003).  
 
Those who call for the removal of any reference to shari'a justify their positions for a variety 
of different reasons (cited in: Kayed 2004, 16): 
 
 Religion and faith concerns the private relationship between an individual and their God 
(Samara 2003, 14) 
 Shari'a contradicts the principle of equality between citizens in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the BL and the DPC (Al-Deeb 2003, 3).  
 Laws should be clear and conclusive while shari’a often lacks such clarity and in many 
instances allows for different interpretations (Shueibi in: Kayed 2004, 14);  
 Shari'a is more useful as a guiding principle for drafting laws rather than as a mechanism 
to enforce the law or resolve litigations between parties (Musallam, in: Kayed 2004, 16);  
 Shari'a could be used in the future by fundamental groups who may demand its total 
application in all aspects of public and private life (Abu Fakher 2004, 18);  
 Shari'a negates the purpose of civil society (Al-Ali 2004, 38).  
 Shari'a negates the possibility of opting for a bi-national state (Abrash 2003). 
 
Some authors preferred the idea of codifying a ‘national’ link between citizens and the state 
rather than one based on religious belief (Jarrar in: Kayed 2004, 17) because Palestinians have 
a particular national identity that includes, but ultimately transcends, religion as it 
incorporates a number of other distinguishing features such as history, language, geography 
and culture (Abrash 2003).  
 
For others, the fact that the majority of Palestinians is Muslim is accepted and sufficiently 
reflected in the reference to Islam as being the ‘official religion in Palestine’. Other Articles 
(concerning shari'a for example) are ambiguous with regard to their objectives and possible 
consequences (Rehan 2004, 131).  
 
 35 
For the Constitutional Committee, as expressed by its President, references to religion and 
shari'a take into account the reality of Palestinian society and its Arab and Islamic identity 
(Nabil Sha'th in: Kayed 2004, 17) as confirmed by several public opinion polls.
32
  
 
According to Dr.Sha'ath, Christian communities who are the most concerned by references to 
shari'a in the constitution, were consulted and agreed on the version adopted in the DPC and 
the religious leaders having provided their comments on the DPC (Fr. Raed Awad, cited in: 
Nawahda 2004, 122).
33
  
 
 
C. A third way to perceive the state-religion relationship  
 
1) Islam is only religion?  
 
The discussion on the various constitutional provisions regarding Islam and shari'a has 
inevitably broadened to encompass the larger issue of the relationship between religion and 
the state. For some authors, the degree of separation between religion and state varies 
according to the particular constitutional system. Theoretically, there are four main 
possibilities (Rehan 2004, 129): 
  
 A theocracy whereby religious institutional representatives replace or dominate civil 
government and is rarely the case in ‘modern’ states;  
 Co-habitation between the state and religion(s) which is often applied in secular states as 
it allows for religious provisions  
 The state disregards religion; the feasibility of this option is dependent on the degree of 
importance given to religion in a given society.  
 The state bans religion and takes steps to systematically prohibit religious practice and 
institutions, as in the case of the former Soviet Union  
 
For some authors, all modern states must separate religious affairs from state affairs. This 
separation represents the middle way between two other more extreme options: the complete 
unity of religion and state, or the opposite whereby the state acts to combat religion. In this 
sense, religion is an individual matter that concerns your own personal relationship with God 
while a homeland is a collective interest that concerns all citizens. In this respect, Islam is a 
religion like any other and not a system for political governance (Hani El-Masri, in: DSP 
2004, 155). The alternative position, in contrast to the above, seeks the creation of an Islamic 
state for political rather than religious reasons (Hani El-Masri, in: DSP 2004, 157).  
 
2) Political Islam 
 
Many authors, while studying the constitutional references to Islam and shari'a made 
comparisons between the BL and DPC, and the Charter and Declaration of Independence. 
They noted the absence of any specific reference to either Islam or shari'a in the PLO 
documents. The reason, they observed, was the reluctance of the PLO to present the conflict 
with Israel or Zionism as a religious conflict. Given that the PLO is a secular institution, the 
version of Palestinian statehood it presented was secular (Odwan 2005, 93).  
 
However, following the first Intifada, the residents of the oPt (so-called ‘inside’ Palestinians) 
witnessed the increasing popularity of Islamic groups who began competing with national or 
                                                
32 See Public Opinion no. 14 of 2003 prepared and published by the Development Studies Program – 
Birzeit University, Ramallah in Annex 5.  
33 However, other researchers have reached a different conclusion concerning this consultation process 
(Kayed 2004, 17-18) 
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secular groups at the level of syndicates, associations, and local institutions for local support 
(Odwan 2005, 96). The references to Islam and shari'a in the BL and DPC are therefore 
included in order to ‘legitimise’ these documents in accordance with the perceived wishes of 
Palestinian society. In other words, the references to Islam and shari'a are really expressions 
of a ‘power struggle’ between the ‘insiders’ and exiles or ‘outsiders’, reflecting the wider 
dialectic between the PLO and the PA and their respective visions of a state.  
 
Some representatives of political parties have spoken publicly on the issue, with particular 
reference to the DPC. For the Front of Palestinian Popular Resistance, the constitutional 
reference to shari'a as source of legislation represents a deterioration when compared to other 
texts that were adopted during the struggle for national liberation, such as the National 
Charter and Declaration of Independence, which present the options for a secular and 
democratic state. Although statehood has not yet been achieved, these documents are part of, 
and indeed facilitate the historical trajectory towards that goal and therefore remain a 
legitimate source or reference point. Furthermore, the division of Palestinians into religious 
communities and groups will necessarily impact on the principle of equal citizenship (DSP 
2004, 257).  
 
For the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (hereinafter PFLP), the constitutional 
reference to shari'a presents a problem for the following reasons: reference to one of the 
sources and not others is not consistent in current textsjustified; the principles of shari'a are 
too vague and therefore open to (mis)interpretation; the provision hinders the separation of 
religion and state institutions of governance; it is also in contradiction with the principle of 
equal citizenship under the law; and a religious (shari’a) rather than civil law will be applied 
for issues relating to ‘personal status’ (DSP 2004, 264).  
 
 
The participation of Hamas in the second legislative elections opened up the discussion on 
political Islam in the oPt. It is also true to say that Hamas does represent a sizeable portion of 
the Palestinian body politic. However, political Islam (defined as Islamic-based political 
action) (Al-Sha'er 2004, 5) is not new to the Palestinians; it has always had a strong and 
influential streak within the Palestinian national movement. The secular party Fatah, 
considered by some to be the embodiment of Palestinian ‘secular nationalism’, has roots 
deeply embedded in Islamic provenance (Khalidi 1995, 8). Accordingly, they assert that 
political Islam is not therefore confined to Islamic groups and/or religious discourse, and in 
the absence of coherent secular discourse, religious one, it has been used by secular groups as 
much as Islamist ones (Habib 2005, 103; Al-Ajrami 2005, 117).  
 
3) Referring to Islam to recognize culture and history 
 
There is a third group that has an interest in the issue of the relationship between religion and 
state but this group is less concerned with constitutional references in this regard. What is 
important is the particular constitutional mechanism established to protect individual and 
minorities rights. Thus, their perceived indifference to constitutional references to Islam is 
dependent on the degree to which Islam will have a determining role in the Palestinian legal 
system.  
 
For this group (Suleiman 2005; Khalil 2006b), Islam is a question of cultural identity and 
historic civilization. This position is also adopted by defenders of secularism because a state 
can be secular, but a society can never be. Thus, they accept a constitutional reference to 
Islam because they recognize the importance of religion for any given society.  
 
The constitutional reference to Islam simply recognises the common belonging of all 
Palestinians to Arab and Islamic culture. This experience is not unique or exclusive to Arab 
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and Islamic countries. However, the reference to shari'a as a source of legislation gives the 
Articles mentioned above an authority that surpasses the cultural dimension of Islam. For this 
reason, some authors have called for the cancellation of the constitutional reference to shari'a. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the reference to shari'a is a political issue and thus 
vulnerable to changes in the internal or external political environment Moreover, this 
reference could be used by state authority to legitimize (on religious grounds) an 
undemocratic government or simply to strengthen its own authority (Habib 2005, 103).  
 
For Abu Sway (2006, 108), there is an almost implicit contract between the ruler and the ruled 
according to which obedience to the ruler is forthcoming in exchange for the upholding of the 
shari'a. However, there is also a kind of tolerance in Islamic history for authoritarian rulers 
based on the notion that it is better to live under a dictator than to be part of a fitna (i.e. 
bloody chaos).  
 
For the authors who adopt the above position, the reference to Islam in the constitution should 
not create any unnecessary confusion or complexity. For this school of thought, the fact that 
Islam is the majority religion of the Palestinian people does not contradict the right to, and 
freedom of, religion or, alternatively, not declaring Islam to be the state religion does not 
automatically mean that freedom of religion is secured. For this group, the reference to Islam 
in constitutional texts should not mean that the legislator must apply or enforce shari'a in 
Palestine (Azmi Shueibi, cited in: Kayed 2004, 13). Here, the reference to Islam and shari'a is 
confined to the remit of positive law: shari'a and religious laws in general are confined to 
personal status issues and not to all aspects of the lives of citizens. In other words, there is a 
difference between the positive constitutions, created within the states, and Islamic 
constitutions (Nawahda 2004, 117-118).  
 
An Islamic religious or theocratic state refers to a state that applies shari'a as the incarnation 
of God's will, as opposed to positive law which is a human construct, thus vesting power and 
authority in the word of God (Muhsein 2005, 60). In this sense, some authors note that it is 
difficult to agree that the specific reference to shari'a in the DPC automatically makes the 
Palestinian state a religious or theocratic one. On the contrary, the fact reference is made to 
shari'a in the constitutional text means that the origin of the obligatory nature of shari'a is not 
‘divine will’ but rather its codification in positive law. In other words, the empowerment of 
shari’a through the BL or DPC means that a ‘secular will’ is the origin of its nature and not 
‘divine will’ (Khalil 2005).  
 
For Milhem (2006, 143) in order to understand the Article which refers to shari'a principles, 
there is a need to compare Islamic jurisprudence with the laws of other legal systems. He 
suggests the Egyptian example, which confirms that shari'a is the main source of law, but 
stresses the possibility for change in order to suit the needs of new socio-economic 
developments.  
 
In other words, shari’a is implemented in accordance with the law by the state and not 
according to fixed doctrinal models (Khalil 2006b, 272). This is the case in neighboring 
countries where Arab and Islamic systems reflect a reality whereby religion is separated de 
facto from the state, such as in a codified (positive) constitution (Hani El-Masry in DSP 2004, 
156).  
 
Other commentators have attempted to interpret democracy in Islamic terms by mixing 
Islamic shura and democracy (‘shuracracy’). In this case, governance or hakemeyya is for 
God but humans can act freely in those areas that are not regulated by religion. Furthermore, 
in some cases it is permissible to violate shari'a in order to save the life of fellow human 
being (Abu Sway 2004, 109-110).  
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D. Possible conflicts between constitution and shari'a  
 
Whatever constitutional references to Islam and shari'a will be decided upon, it is considered 
important to determine whether the constitution or shari’a will be considered as the supreme 
source of law. A number of potential conflicts between the application of constitutional or 
shari’a law have been identified; those possible contradictions will need to be dealt with by 
the drafters of the constitution or eventually the constitutional court. Moreover, some authors 
have suggested that a reference to the ‘principles’ of shari'a is ambiguous given that shari'a is 
a particular method of application and practice rather than a ‘principle’. This ambiguity is a 
source of potential conflict regarding the drafting of a future constitution (Rehan 2004, 131).  
 
1) Women's rights 
 
A number of authors have looked at the rights of women and shari’a (Abdo 1999, 44; Jubran 
2004; Rehan 2004; Said 2004c; Khalil 2005a; Khalil 2006b, 272-273, Muhsein 2005) and 
two main positions have been identified:  
 
 Those who prefer that the state and constitution should be created before judging how 
references to shari’a could potentially have legal consequences to the constitutionally 
protected rights of women.  
 Those who would prefer to resolve the issue prior to statehood and the promulgation of 
the constitution on the basis that it will be easier to make amendments while the 
constitution is still in draft format  
 
For Khashan (2004), Islam has protected women and ensured several rights including their 
participation in public and political meetings, and the expression of political opinions. 
Furthermore, the DPC ensures direct and indirect protection and guarantees for women and 
the adoption of international standards included in conventions and declarations.  
 
It should be noted that in the first DPC (Article 63), it stated that “Women are the full sisters 
of men. They have rights and duties as guaranteed by the shari`a and established in law”. 
However, according to that provision, the principles of shari’a have priority over the 
constitution in matters related to women's rights. This article was widely criticized (Khalil 
2006, 259) and the Constitutional Committee cancelled it in the second and third versions of 
the DPC. In these later versions of the draft DPC, it is stated that the "constitutional and 
shari’a rights of women shall be safeguarded" (Article 23). This means that these rights are 
accumulative and that the existence of the shari'a provision cannot be used in justification of 
a violation of a constitutional right.  
 
This represents a positive change towards constitutionally protected women's rights but it 
does not provide procedures and mechanisms to ensure the superiority of the constitution over 
shari’a in the case of conflict for example with regard to the relationship between the 
constitutional court and the religious/shari'a courts. 
 
It is not only a question of shari'a and religion; it is also a question of society and culture. 
Should the law ensure full citizenship for women or should it codify the social status quo 
whereby women are often perceived as second class citizens? For example, following the 
establishment of the PA, women were told that when they applied for a passport they needed 
to have a male guardian. Following a successful lobbying campaign by women’s 
organizations and certain individuals, a Presidential Decree was issued that permits women to 
apply freely for their own passports (Bullata 2006, 113). This demonstrates not only the high 
level of political awareness amongst women’s groups but also the gaps in the system that are 
vulnerable to executive exploitation or misinterpretation. 
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For Said (2004c, 212), provision for the protection of women's constitutional and shari'a 
rights is discriminatory because it refers exclusively to women; the implication being that 
men have total freedom to regulate women’s rights while they themselves have limitless 
freedom.  
 
Special attention has been given by the Palestinian legislature to gender issues for example, 
female quotas for political party representation in municipal and legislative elections. This 
was made possible by the persistent lobbying of several civil society organisations (Bullata 
2006, 114). There were various reactions to this idea ranging from complete rejection, 
because it contradicts the principle of equality between citizens, to complete support for 
positive discrimination aimed at reducing their de facto inequality (Samara 2003, 14; Yusuf 
2005, 67; Said 2004c; Khalil 2005a; Khalil 2006b).  
 
2) Shari'a Principles and International Law 
 
There is a lack of information in the Palestinian literature on the relationship and potential 
contradictions between international law and shari'a principles (Rehan 2004). Given that the 
PLO and PA have, on several occasions, publicly adhered to or expressed their will to abide 
by international human rights norms and conventions it would appear that the Palestinian 
leadership is willing to prioritise respect for universal human rights within Palestinian 
constitutional texts. The BL (Art. 10) states that: "Basic human rights and liberties shall be 
protected and respected. The Palestinian National Authority shall work without delay to 
become a party to regional and international declarations and covenants that protect human 
rights". The reference in the BL, however, implies that international law does not have direct 
effect in domestic law unless it is ratified by the Palestinian legislature (Milhem 2006, 141).  
 
However, the extent of a potential contradiction between shari'a (as a source of legislation) 
and international law in general, and with regard to human rights in particular, varies 
according to author: 
  
 Some suggest that there is no contradiction between shari'a and the principle of universal 
human rights but call for the application of shari'a whenever a contradiction arises with 
regard to international law and related conventions (Nasser Deen Sha'er in: Kayed 2004, 
14);  
 Others point to the literal text in the BL and DPC which reflects their opinion that 
international law should prevail whenever there is a contradiction between the two 
approaches (Jubran 2004, 206).  
 
For example, the issue of freedom of religion as expressed in the Declaration of Human 
Rights and several other international documents and conventions. Is there a contradiction 
between freedom of religion, as envisaged in these international documents, and the fact that 
Islam is the official religion of the state of Palestine? (Al-Haq 1996, 30; Khalil 2006b, 275).  
In the BL and DPC, reference is made only to freedom of confession (or credo) and freedom 
to practice religion. But reference to religious freedom, which includes the right to adhere to, 
change and/or leave a particular religion, is not mentioned and therefore not guaranteed (Al-
Deeb 2003). In this sense, the BL and the DPC seem to have adopted a strict interpretation of 
freedom in religious affairs.  
 
It should also be noted that ‘freedom’ is granted only to the monotheistic religions’ (Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam). But very few authors have criticized this limitation due to the fact that 
other faiths are rarely represented in the oPt. This article, however, shall be reviewed, if we 
consider that a constitutional text is not not intended to regulate Palestinian lives today but 
rather in the future (Khalil 2006b, 275).  
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The BL and DPC have adopted similar constitutional provisions to those of neighboring 
countries with regard to religion. However, the right to freedom of conscience and religion 
has particular importance in the oPt because Jerusalem is considered to be the guardian of the 
three monotheistic religions. Crucially, both the BL and DPC lack references to the 
importance of the Holy Land to the monotheistic religions with regard to existing 
arrangements with concerned actors such as the Holy See. 
 
Furthermore, many authors like to point out that the conflict with Israel should be clearly 
identified as being primarily a political one, based on the Palestinian right to self-
determination and national liberation from Israeli occupation. In this regard, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is not a religious conflict and should not therefore be understood as such 
(Khalil 2006b, 277).  
 
3) Religious Minorities  
 
In the oPt, the majority of Palestinians is Muslim while a minority is Christian who are 
mainly concentrated in a number of cities and villages in the Central West Bank. Although 
greatly reduced in number now, Christians have always been part of Palestinian society and 
together with Muslim Palestinians, have participated in the process of nation and state 
building (Khalil 2006b, 278). However, Christianity is distinguished from other monotheistic 
religions by the Christian tradition for a strict separation between church and state; a 
separation that keeps the church outside political considerations on the one hand but that 
encourages Christians, as other citizens, to participate in politics, which is considered as the 
commitment towards the public good (Lahham 2004, 36).  
 
As outlined in the BL and also the DPC, equality between citizens is guaranteed which 
ensures that religious majorities are not favoured, in any respect – political, social or 
economic – over a minority.  
 
For all Palestinians, including the Muslim majority, there is no doubt that Christians, although 
they are a minority, form a constituent part of the Palestinian nation. However, there have 
been various debates and discussions on the future of Palestinian Christians with regard to the 
constitutional references to Islam and shari'a. The position of an authoritative Christian 
leader, Msgr. Michel Sabbah, perhaps best expresses the view commonly held by most 
Christian leaders: "It is useless to discuss this question if different communities, Muslim or 
Christian, have the mentality of winning or losing, at the expense of the other, as if we are in 
different teams, each trying to catch the ball and take it to their side or camp, as the victor. 
Daily life pushes us to be in the same camp, and no one wins if the other loses. We both win 
if a new Palestine, with a new face, is born, that inspires mutual trust and security for 
Muslims and Christians… if we nurture this mentality, we will find the best expressions that 
reflect this new culture, for the Constitution" (Cited in: Nawahda 2004, 122).
34
  
 
There are some indications that the Palestinian legislature intends to enforce the principle of 
equality in a substantial and not just formal, theoretical or factual sense. The adoption of the 
quota system in legislative and municipal elections proves this approach. However, for some 
authors, legal protection for some minorities against societal discrimination is not enough and 
could lead to the need for a re-evaluation of the concept of citizenship and identity itself 
(Jubran 2004, 205).  
                                                
34  The speech was made at the University of Bethlehem, and published in Arabic on the internet, 
translated by the author of this report http://www.lpj.org/Nonviolence/Patriarch/BUniversityara.htm  
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Annex 1: Various Concepts of "Separation of Powers"  
 
In the Palestinian literature, the "separation of powers" does not reflect only the classical 
concept, i.e. the separation of the Legislative, executive and judicial powers and their 
reciprocal oversight and collaboration. On the contrary, Palestinians talk about the "separation 
of powers" but mean at least four different things: 
 
1) The Separation of Legislative, executive and Judiciary;  
2) The Separation of PLO from PA institutions;  
3) The Separation (within the PA executive) between the President and the Prime 
Minister & the cabinet; 
4) The separation between the public sphere and the private sector & civil society 
domains.  
 
 
List of Abbreviations:  
 
PLO:  Palestine Liberation Organization 
PA:  Palestinian Authority 
PNC: Palestinian National Council 
PLC: Palestinian Legislative Council 
CC: Central Council 
EC:  Executive Committee  
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The Separation of Powers 
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The Separation of Powers: 
Second Level:  
The Separation of PLO from PA institutions 
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The Separation of Powers: 
Fourth Level:  
The separation between the public and the private sectors 
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Annex 2: The Legislative Process 
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Annex 3: Pubic Opinions  
 
Development Studies Program – Birzeit University 
 
Public Opinion n. 10 of 2002 
 
Division over use of Islamic Sharia (Law) 
Palestinians are divided on the use of Sharia as the "basis for legislation" in the proposed 
Palestinian Constitution; 38% see that Islamic Sharia' is the sole source of legislation. In 
contrast, 33% believe that human and civic rights must be the source of legislation. Another 
29% see Islamic Sharia' as a primary source, but combined with human rights and 
international conventions. For 8% (out of this 29%) Sharia is acceptable as a primary source, 
but conditional upon the approval of an elected body.  
 
Shari'a in governance might lead to abuse of power 
While many Palestinians feel that Sharia is an important element in their lives, many feel that 
the implementation of Sharia might not be "practical". About 54% feel that the use of Sharia 
in governance will lead to abuse of religion by the government only to reinforce its own 
power. Furthermore, the majority of respondents (76%) do not perceive the establishment of 
an Islamic state to be a realistic option.  
Support for democracy 
It is also interesting to note that that over 66% of the respondents approve of an article stating 
that (the Palestinian political system is democratic, parliamentary, and based on political 
pluralism). 
All Palestinians are born equal 
In addition, 92% approve on an article stating that (all Palestinians are equal before the law 
with equal rights and duties, and no discrimination will exit based on race, sex, color, 
religion, political opinion, or disability). 
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Public Opinion n. 14 of 2003 
 
Sources of Legislation 
38% believe Islamic Shari’a should be the only source of legislation.  
17% see Islamic Shari’a as a main source of legislation combined with respect paid to 
universal principles of human rights and the international treaties.  
Characteristics of the State 
56% see religion as the chief characteristic of a future Palestinian state, 32% see democracy 
as the main characteristic. 6% also see a future state in socialist terms and 6% Arab 
nationalist.  
82% support a constitution based on equality between Muslims and Christians. 76% support a 
constitution based on equality between sexes.  
A majority of Palestinians believe in tolerance and pluralism and desire a community based 
on principles of equal rights and individual freedoms. Palestinian attitudes on a range of 
social issues, as follows: Democratic system in the Palestinian state, 81%; Religion is a 
personal matter, 81% ; Separation between religion and state, 51%.  
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Annex 4: Amended Basic Law of 2003 
 
The Amended Basic Law
35
  
Promulgated on 18 March 2003
36  
(Consolidated Version)
37
 
 
 
In the Name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate.  
 
Introduction 
 
The continuous attachment of the Arab Palestinian people to the land of their fathers and forefathers, 
on which this people has historically lived, is a fact that has been expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence, issued by the Palestine National Council. The strength of this attachment is confirmed 
by its consistency over time and place, by keeping faith with and holding onto national identity, and in 
the realization of wondrous accomplishments of struggle. The organic relationship between the 
Palestinian people, their history and their land has confirmed itself in their unceasing effort to prompt 
the world to recognize the rights of the Arab Palestinian people and their national entity, on equal 
footing with other nations.  
 
The birth of the Palestinian National Authority in the national homeland of Palestine, the land of their 
forefathers, comes within the context of continuous and vigorous struggle, during which the Palestinian 
people witnessed thousands of their precious children sacrificed as martyrs, injured persons and 
prisoners of war, all in order to achieve their people’s clear national rights, the foremost of which are 
the right of return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish an independent Palestinian 
state, with Jerusalem as a capital, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the 
sole, legitimate representative of the Arab Palestinian people wherever they exist.  
 
Within the framework of the interim period, resulting in the Declaration of Principles Agreement, the 
establishment of the Palestinian National Authority with its three pillars – the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches – became among the most urgent of national missions. The establishment of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council, through free and direct general elections, made the adoption of a Basic 
Law suitable for the interim period a necessary foundation upon which to organize the mutual 
relationship between the government and the people. It is a first step on the way to determining the 
distinguishing characteristics of a civil society capable of achieving its independence. At the same time, 
it is a basic foundation upon which to enact unifying legislation and law for the Palestinian national 
homeland. 
 
This Basic Law has established a firm foundation, representing the collective conscience of our people, 
including its spiritual components, its national faith and its nationalist loyalty. The titles of the Basic 
Law include a group of modern constitutional rules and principles that address public and personal 
rights and liberties in a manner that achieves justice and equality for all, without discrimination. 
Further, they ensure the rule of law, strike a balance between the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches, and draw lines between their respective jurisdictions in a manner that ensures independence 
to each of them while coordinating their roles to achieve a high national interest that will serve as a 
guide to all.  
 
                                                
35 Translation into English for the Palestine Yearbook of International Law, published in Al-Muqtafi – 
Institute of Law, Birzeit University. Some changes to the translation were effectuated by author and 
shall be indicated each time is done. 
36 Published in the Palestine Official Gazette, Special Issue No. 2, March 19, 2003. The original Basic 
Law was published in the Palestine Official Gazette, Special Issue, July 7, 2002.  
37 The 2003 Basic Law was amended by the Basic Law of 2005 Concerning the Amendment of 
Some of the Provisions of the Amended Basic Law of 2003, published in Palestine Official Gazette, 
Issue No. 57, August 2005. This consolidated version is done by the author of the report, thus 
unofficial and under his own responsibility. The articles amended or added in 2005 were duly 
underlined, while providing also the original text in footnote, for information.  
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The enactment of this temporary Basic Law for a transitional and interim period constitutes a 
fundamental step towards the realization of the firm national and historical rights of the Arab 
Palestinian people. It shall not in any way whatsoever abrogate or cancel their right to continue to strive 
to achieve their rights of return and self-determination, including the establishment of a Palestinian 
state with Jerusalem (al-Quds al-Sharif) as its capital, which is the first shrine and the third mosque, to 
which the Prophet Muhammad, may peace be upon him, traveled by night, in the land of the nativity of 
Jesus, may peace be upon him.  
 
The provisional character of the Basic Law shall not abrogate the right of any Palestinian, wherever 
residing, to exercise equal rights with his/her fellow citizens on the soil of the homeland.  
 
This temporary Basic Law draws its strength from the will of the Palestinian people, their firm rights, 
their continuous struggle and the exercise of their democratic right – as represented in the election of 
the President of the Palestinian National Authority and the members of the Palestinian Legislative 
Council – to commence the organization and establishment of a sound, democratic and legislative life 
in Palestine. At the same time, the enactment and ratification of this law by the Legislative Council 
does spring from the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Arab Palestinian people.  
 
 
Explanatory Memorandum 
for the Amended Basic Law 
 
Article 11138[2] of the Basic Law provides the Legislative Council with the authority to amend the Basic 
Law by securing a majority vote of two-thirds of its members. The Council believes that it is necessary 
to amend the Basic Law to allow for the creation of the position of a Prime Minister in the Palestinian 
National Authority and to determine his powers and the legal and political controls that will regulate 
his work, as well as to define and clarify the form of the relationship between him and the President of 
the Palestinian National Authority and the legislative branch. 
 
This amendment requires rearrangement of some provisions of the original law. Accordingly, the title 
that deals with the powers of the President of the National Authority is now Title Three in the amended 
law. On the other hand, the title that deals with the legislative branch has been moved to a subsequent 
title, which is Title Four.  
 
As for Title Five, dealing with the Council of Ministers, it covers the formation of the government by 
the Prime Minister, the procedure for obtaining the confidence of the [Legislative] Council, the powers 
of the Council of Ministers and its head, and the relationship between the Prime Minister and the 
President of the National Authority.  
 
The Council decided during the review of the amended law that it would not be necessary to add 
provisions dealing with the Prime Minster’s presentation of all matters related to the formation, 
resignation or dissolution of the cabinet to the President of the National Authority, on the grounds that 
this is a political tradition that does not require being put into a separate article in the text of the law.  
 
Ahmed Qurei’ (Abu Ala’)  
Speaker 
The Palestinian Legislative Council  
 
 
 
TITLE ONE 
 
Article 1 
 
                                                
38 Editor’s note: Article 111 refers to the original text of the Basic Law as published in July 2002. In the 
Amended Basic Law, it becomes Article 120. The reason for this apparent discrepancy is that the 
Palestinian Legislator has chosen to integrate the March 2003 amendments into a consolidated text. 
This has involved numbering anew a substantial part of the original articles.  
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Palestine is part of the larger Arab world, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation. Arab 
unity is an objective that the Palestinian people shall work to achieve.  
 
Article 2 
 
The people are the source of power, which shall be exercised through the legislative, executive and 
judicial authorities, based upon the principle of separation of powers and in the manner set forth in this 
Basic Law.  
 
Article 3 
 
Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine.  
 
Article 4 
 
1. Islam is the official religion in Palestine. Respect for the sanctity of all other divine religions shall 
be maintained.  
2. The principles of Islamic Shari’a shall be a principal source of legislation.  
3. Arabic shall be the official language.  
 
Article 5 
 
The governing system in Palestine shall be a democratic representative39 system, based upon political 
and party pluralism. The President of the National Authority shall be directly elected by the people. 
The government shall be accountable to the President and to the Palestinian Legislative Council.  
 
Article 6 
 
The principle of the rule of law shall be the basis of government in Palestine. All governmental powers, 
agencies, institutions and individuals shall be subject to the law.  
 
Article 7 
 
Palestinian citizenship shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 8 
 
The flag of Palestine shall be of four colors and in accordance with the dimensions and measurements 
approved by the Palestine Liberation Organization. It shall be the official flag of the country.  
 
TITLE TWO: 
PUBLIC RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
 
Article 9 
 
Palestinians shall be equal before the law and the judiciary, without distinction based upon race, sex, 
color, religion, political views or disability.  
 
Article 10 
 
1. Basic human rights and liberties shall be protected and respected.  
2. The Palestinian National Authority shall work without delay to become a party to regional and 
international declarations and covenants that protect human rights. 
 
Article 11 
 
1. Personal freedom is a natural right, shall be guaranteed and may not be violated. 
                                                
39 Original translation was: Parliamentary. I prefer to use the term "representative" to indicate neyabee 
used by Arab original text.  
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2. It is unlawful to arrest, search, imprison, restrict the freedom, or prevent the movement of 
any person, except by judicial order in accordance with the provisions of the law. The law 
shall specify the period of prearrest detention. Imprisonment or detention shall only be 
permitted in places that are subject to laws related to the organization of prisons. 
 
Article 12 
 
Every arrested or detained person shall be informed of the reason for their arrest or detention. They 
shall be promptly informed, in a language they understand, of the nature of the charges brought against 
them. They shall have the right to contact a lawyer and to be tried before a court without delay.  
 
Article 13 
 
1. No person shall be subject to any duress or torture. Indictees and all persons deprived of their 
freedom shall receive proper treatment.  
2. All statements or confessions obtained through violation of the provisions contained in paragraph 1 
of this article shall be considered null and void.  
 
Article 14 
 
An accused person is considered innocent until proven guilty in a court of law that guarantees the 
accused the right to a defense. Any person accused in a criminal case shall be represented by a lawyer.  
 
Article 15 
 
Punishment shall be personal. Collective punishment is prohibited. Crime and punishment shall only be 
determined by the law. Punishment shall be imposed only by judicial order and shall apply only to 
actions committed after the entry into force of the law. 
 
Article 16 
 
It is unlawful to conduct any medical or scientific experiment on any person without prior legal 
consent. No person shall be subject to medical examination, treatment or surgery, except in accordance 
with the law.  
 
Transplantation of human organs and new scientific developments shall be regulated by the law in 
order to serve legitimate humanitarian purposes. 
 
Article 17 
 
Homes shall be inviolable; they may not be subject to surveillance, broken into or searched, except in 
accordance with a valid judicial order and in accordance with the provisions of the law.  
 
Any consequences resulting from violations of this article shall be considered invalid. Individuals who 
suffer from such violation shall be entitled to a fair remedy, guaranteed by the Palestinian National 
Authority.  
 
Article 18 
 
Freedom of belief, worship and the performance of religious functions are guaranteed, provided public 
order or public morals are not violated.  
 
Article 19 
 
Freedom of opinion may not be prejudiced. Every person shall have the right to express his opinion and 
to circulate it orally, in writing or in any form of expression or art, with due consideration to the 
provisions of the law.  
 
Article 20 
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Freedom of residence and movement shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law.  
 
Article 21 
 
1. The economic system in Palestine shall be based on the principles of a free market economy. The 
executive branch may establish public companies that shall be regulated by a law.  
2. Freedom of economic activity is guaranteed. The law shall define the rules governing its 
supervision and their limits. 
3. Private property, both real estate and movable assets, shall be protected and may not be 
expropriated except in the public interest and for fair compensation in accordance with the law or 
pursuant to a judicial ruling.  
4. Confiscation shall be in accordance with a judicial ruling.  
 
Article 22 
 
1. Social, health, disability and retirement insurance shall be regulated by law.  
2. Maintaining the welfare of families of martyrs, prisoners of war, the injured and the disabled is a 
duty that shall be regulated by law. The National Authority shall guarantee these persons 
education, health and social insurance.  
 
Article 23 
 
Every citizen shall have the right to proper housing. The Palestinian National Authority shall secure 
housing for those who are without shelter.  
 
Article 24 
 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to education. It shall be compulsory until at least the end of the 
basic level. Education shall be free in public schools and institutions.  
2. The National Authority shall supervise all levels of education and its institutions, and shall strive 
to upgrade the educational system.  
3. The law shall guarantee the independence of universities, institutes of higher education, and 
scientific research centers in a manner that guarantees the freedom of scientific research as well as 
literary, artistic and cultural creativity. The National Authority shall encourage and support such 
creativity.  
4. Private schools and educational institutions shall comply with the curriculum approved by the 
National Authority and shall be subject to its supervision.  
 
Article 25 
 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to work, which is a duty and honor. The Palestinian National 
Authority shall strive to provide work for any individual capable of performing it.  
2. Work relations shall be organized in a manner that guarantees justice to all and provides workers 
with welfare, security, and health and social benefits.  
3. Organization of unions is a right that shall be regulated by the law.  
4. The right to conduct a strike shall be exercised within the limits of the law.  
 
Article 26 
 
Palestinians shall have the right to participate in political life, both individually and in groups. They 
shall have the following rights in particular: 
1. To form, establish and join political parties in accordance with the law. 
2. To form and establish unions, associations, societies, clubs and popular institutions in accordance 
with the law. 
3. To vote, to nominate candidates and to run as candidates for election, in order to have 
representatives elected through universal suffrage in accordance with the law.  
4. To hold public office and positions, in accordance with the principle of equal opportunities.  
5. To conduct private meetings without the presence of police members, and to conduct public 
meetings, gatherings and processions, within the limits of the law.  
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Article 27 
 
1. Establishment of newspapers and all media means is a right for all, guaranteed by this Basic Law. 
Their financing resources shall be subject to the scrutiny of the law.  
2. Freedom of audio, visual, and written media, as well as freedom to print, publish, distribute and 
transmit, together with the freedom of individuals working in this field, shall be guaranteed by this 
Basic Law and other related laws.  
3. Censorship of the media shall be prohibited. No warning, suspension, confiscation, cancellation or 
restriction shall be imposed upon the media except by law, and pursuant to a judicial ruling.  
 
Article 28 
 
No Palestinian may be deported from the homeland, prevented or prohibited from returning to or 
leaving it, deprived of his citizenship, or handed over to any foreign entity.  
 
Article 29 
 
Maternal and childhood welfare are national duties. Children shall have the right to:  
1. Comprehensive protection and welfare.  
2. Not to be exploited for any purpose whatsoever, and not to be permitted to perform work that 
might damage their safety, health or education.  
3. Protection from harmful and cruel treatment. 
4. Not to be subjected to beating or cruel treatment by their relatives.  
5. To be segregated – in cases where they are sentenced to a penalty that deprives them of their 
freedom – from adults, and be treated in a manner that is appropriate to their age and aims at their 
rehabilitation.  
 
Article 30 
 
1. Submitting a case to court is a protected and guaranteed right for all people. Each Palestinian shall 
have the right to seek redress in the judicial system. Litigation procedures shall be organized by 
law to guarantee prompt settlement of cases.  
2. Laws may not contain any provisions that provide immunity to any administrative decision or 
action or against judicial review.  
3. Judicial error shall result in a remedy by the National Authority. Conditions and methods of such 
remedy shall be regulated by law.  
 
Article 31 
 
An independent commission for human rights shall be established pursuant to a law that will specify its 
formation, duties and jurisdiction. The commission shall submit its reports to the President of the 
National Authority and to the Palestinian Legislative Council.  
 
Article 32 
 
Any violation of any personal freedom, of the sanctity of the private life of human beings, or of any of 
the rights or liberties that have been guaranteed by law or by this Basic Law shall be considered a 
crime. Criminal and civil cases resulting from such violations may not be subject to any statute of 
limitations. The National Authority shall guarantee a fair remedy to those who suffer from such 
damage.  
 
Article 33 
 
The enjoyment of a balanced and clean environment is a human right. The preservation and protection 
of the Palestinian environment from pollution for the sake of present and future generations is a 
national duty.  
 
TITLE THREE: 
The President of the Palestinian National Authority 
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Article 34 
 
The President of the Palestinian National Authority shall be elected in a general and direct election by 
the Palestinian people, in accordance with the Palestinian Election Law.  
 
Article 35 
 
Before assuming office, the President shall take the following oath before the Legislative Council and 
in the presence of the Speaker of the Palestinian National Council and the President of the High Court: 
 “I swear by God, the Almighty, to be faithful to the homeland and to its 
sacred places, to the people and its national heritage, to respect the 
constitutional system and the law, and to safeguard the interests of the 
Palestinian people completely, as God is my witness.”  
 
 
Article 36 
 
The term of the presidency of the National Authority shall be four years. The President shall have the 
right to nominate himself for a second term of presidency, provided that he shall not occupy the 
position of the presidency more than two consecutive terms. 40  
 
Article 37 
 
1. The office of the President shall be considered vacant in any of the following cases:  
a. Death; 
b. Resignation submitted to the Palestinian Legislative Council, if 
accepted by two-thirds of its members; 
c. Loss of legal capacity, as per a ruling issued by the High 
Constitutional Court and subsequently approved by a majority of two-thirds of the members of 
the Legislative Council.   
2. If the office of the President of the National Authority becomes vacant due to any of the above 
cases, the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council shall temporarily assume the powers and 
duties of the Presidency of the National Authority for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days, 
during which free and direct elections to elect a new President shall take place in accordance with 
the Palestinian Election Law.  
 
Article 38 
 
The President of the National Authority shall exercise his executive duties as specified in this law. 
 
Article 39 
 
The President of the National Authority is the Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Forces. 
 
Article 40 
 
The President of the National Authority shall appoint and terminate the services of the National 
Authority’s delegates to foreign countries, international organizations and foreign agencies. The 
President shall accept the credentials of foreign delegates to the Palestinian National Authority.  
 
Article 41 
 
1. The President of the National Authority shall promulgate the laws voted by the Palestinian 
Legislative Council within thirty (30) days of their transmittal to him. The President may refer a 
law back to the Legislative Council with his observations and the reasons of his objection within 
the same period. Otherwise, the law will be deemed promulgated and will be published in the 
Official Gazette.  
                                                
40 Original text: "The term of the presidency of the National Authority shall be the interim phase, after 
which the President shall be elected in accordance with the law".  
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2. If the President of the National Authority returns the proposed law to the Legislative Council in 
conformity with the time limit and conditions specified in the previous paragraph, the Council 
shall debate the law again. If the Council passes the law a second time by a majority of two-thirds 
of its members, the proposed law shall be considered approved and shall be immediately published 
in the Official Gazette.  
 
Article 42 
 
The President of the National Authority has the right to grant special pardons or to commute sentences. 
However, general amnesties or amnesties for crimes may not be granted except by law.  
 
Article 43 
 
The President of the National Authority shall have the right, in cases of necessity that cannot be 
delayed, and when the Legislative Council is not in session, to issue decrees that have the power of 
law. These decrees shall be presented to the Legislative Council in the first session convened after their 
issuance; otherwise they will cease to have the power of law. If these decrees are presented to the 
Legislative Council, as mentioned above, but are not approved by the latter, then they shall cease to 
have the power of law.  
 
Article 44 
 
The President’s salary, allowances and remuneration shall be determined by law.  
 
Article 45 
 
The President of the National Authority shall appoint the Prime Minister and authorize the latter to 
constitute his government. The President shall have the right to dismiss the Prime Minister or to accept 
his resignation and to request him to convene the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 46 
 
The Council of Ministers shall assist the President in the performance of the President’s duties and 
exercise of powers, in the manner stipulated in this Basic Law.  
 
TITLE FOUR: 
THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY 
 
Article 47 
 
1. The Palestinian Legislative Council is the elected legislative authority.  
2. The Legislative Council shall assume its legislative and oversight duties as prescribed in its 
Standing Orders, insofar as they do not contradict the provisions of this law.  
3. The term of the Legislative Council shall be four years from the date of its being elected and the 
elections shall be conducted once each four years in a regular manner.41  
 
Article (47 bis)  
The term of the current Legislative Council shall terminate when the members of the new elected 
Council take the constitutional oath.42  
 
Article 48 
1. The members of the Legislative Council shall be elected in general, free and direct elections in 
accordance with the provisions of the Elections Law, which shall determine the number of members, 
electoral constituencies and electoral system.  
 
                                                
41 Original text: "The term of this Council shall be the interim period". 
42 This article was added in 2005 amendments.  
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2. In the event the position of a member of more than a member of the Legislative Council becomes 
vacant, the vacancy shall be occupied in accordance with the provisions of the Elections Law.43  
 
Article 49 
 
Before commencing work, every Member shall take the following oath before the Council:  
“I swear by God, the Almighty, to be faithful to the homeland, to preserve 
the rights and interests of the people and the nation, to respect the law, and 
to perform my duties in the best manner, as God is my witness.”  
 
Article 50 
 
In its first meeting, the Council shall elect a Speaker, two Deputies to the Speaker, and a Secretary-
General. Together, they shall make up the Office of the Legislative Council. It shall not be permitted to 
be a member of the Office and hold at the same time the position of President of the National 
Authority, or Minister, or any other governmental position.  
 
Article 51 
 
The Council shall accept the resignation of its Members and establish its own Standing Orders, as well 
as procedures for questioning its Members, in a manner that does not contradict the provisions of this 
Basic Law or general constitutional principles. The Council shall be solely responsible for maintaining 
order and security during sessions and committee meetings. Security personnel may not be present in 
the Council premises unless requested by the Speaker or by a Committee Chair, as the circumstances 
may require.  
 
Article 52 
 
The President of the Palestinian National Authority shall open the first ordinary session of the Council 
and deliver an opening address.  
 
Article 53 
 
1. Council Members may not be questioned in civil or criminal proceedings due to opinions they 
express, facts they mention, their voting in Council sessions or committee meetings, or because of 
any action they undertake outside the Council in the course of performing their parliamentary 
duties.  
2. No Member shall be interfered with in any manner, nor shall any search be made of a Member’s 
luggage, home, place of residence, car, office, or any real estate or movable property belonging to 
the Member, throughout the period of immunity.  
3. No Member of the Legislative Council shall be required during the period of membership, or 
subsequently, to testify on any subject regarding Council-related actions, statements or information 
obtained as a result of membership in the Council, unless the Member voluntarily agrees to do so 
and has the prior consent of the Council.  
4. No penal measures shall be taken against any Member of the Legislative Council unless a Member 
is found red-handed in the commission of a crime. The Council shall be notified immediately 
about measures taken against a Member so that the Council may decide upon its proper course of 
action in the matter. The Office of the Council shall assume this responsibility if the Council is not 
in session. 
5. A Member of the Legislative Council shall not relinquish parliamentary immunity without the 
prior permission of the Council. Immunity shall not lapse after membership in the Council ceases 
but shall be subject to the limits prevailing during the membership period.  
 
Article 54 
                                                
43 Original text: 1) The Legislative Council shall be composed of eighty-eight (88) Members elected in 
accordance with the law. 2) If the position of one or more Members becomes vacant due to death, 
resignation or loss of capacity, partial elections shall be conducted in the relevant district to elect a 
successor, in accordance with the law.  
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1. A Member of the Legislative Council may not exploit Council membership in any type of private 
business or in any manner whatsoever. 
2. Members of the Legislative Council shall present financial statements for themselves, their spouse 
and their minor children that detail their wealth, including real estate and movable property both 
inside Palestine and abroad, as well as debts. These statements shall be kept in sealed confidential 
envelopes at the High Court of Justice and may not be accessed unless permitted by the Court and 
within the limits it allows.  
 
Article 55 
Allocations, rights and obligations of the members of the Legislative Council and Ministers shall be 
determined by law.44  
 
Article 56 
 
Each Member of the Council shall have the following rights:  
1. To submit to the executive branch all legitimate requests necessary to enable the Member to carry 
out parliamentary functions.  
2. To propose laws. Rejected proposals may not be resubmitted within the same term.  
3. To address inquiries and interpellations to the government, to any Minister or to others of similar 
rank. Interpellations may only be discussed seven days after submission, unless the addressee 
agrees to reply immediately or within a shorter period. However, the seven-day period can be 
shortened to three days in urgent cases and with the approval of the President of the National 
Authority.  
 
Article 57 
 
1. Following an interpellation, a minimum of ten Members of the Council may submit a request to 
withdraw confidence from the government or from any Minister. Voting on such a request may not 
be held earlier than three days after submission. A decision may be issued by approval of the 
majority of the Council’s Members.  
2. Withdrawal of confidence shall result in termination of the term of the party from whom 
confidence was withdrawn.  
 
Article 58 
 
The Council may form special committees or entrust one of its committees to conduct information 
gathering and fact-finding regarding any public matter or regarding any public institution.  
 
Article 59 
 
The Legislative Council shall approve the General Development Plan. The law shall specify the way to 
prepare and present the Plan to the Council.  
 
Article 60 
 
The law shall regulate the specific rules governing the preparation and approval of the general budget 
and disbursement of funds appropriated in it, as well as any attached budgets, developmental budgets, 
budgets for public institutions and services, and budgets for any project in which the government’s 
investment comprises at least 50% of its capital.  
 
Article 61 
 
Taking into consideration the provisions of Article 90 of this Basic Law:  
                                                
44 Original text: "A Member of the Legislative Council shall receive a monthly salary determined by 
law".  
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1. The government shall present the draft budget to the Legislative Council at least two months prior 
to the start of the fiscal year.  
2. The Legislative Council shall convene a special session to discuss the annual draft budget. It shall 
either ratify it with the necessary amendments prior to the start of the new fiscal year or send it 
back to the government, within a period not exceeding one month from the date of receipt. The 
returned draft budget shall include the Council’s observations so that its requirements can be 
fulfilled and the draft budget resubmitted to the Legislative Council for approval.  
3. The Council’s voting on the general budget shall be title by title.  
4. Transfer of funds between the various budget titles is not permitted unless it is agreed upon 
between the Legislative Council and the Executive branch.  
 
Article 62 
 
The final accounts of the National Authority’s budget shall be presented to the Legislative Council no 
later than one year after the end of the fiscal year. The Council shall vote on the final accounts title by 
title.  
 
TITLE FIVE: 
THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
 
Article 63 
 
The Council of Ministers (the “government”) is the highest executive and administrative instrument; it 
shoulders the responsibility for implementing the program that has been approved by the legislative 
branch. Except for the executive powers of the President of the National Authority, as specified in this 
Basic Law, executive and administrative powers shall be within the competence of the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
Article 64 
 
1. The Council of Ministers shall comprise a Prime Minister and a number of Ministers, not to exceed 
twenty-four (24) in number. 
2. The appointment shall identify to which Ministry each Minister shall be assigned. 
 
Formation of the Government 
 
Article 65 
 
1. Once appointed by the President of the Palestinian National Authority, the Prime Minister shall 
form a government within three weeks of the date of appointment. There shall be a right to an 
extension of a maximum of two weeks. 
2. If the Prime Minister fails to form a government within the stated deadline or does not obtain the 
confidence of the Legislative Council, then the President of the National Authority shall appoint 
another Prime Minister within two weeks of the passing of the deadline or the date of the 
confidence session, whichever applies. Provisions contained in the above paragraph 1 shall apply 
to the new Prime Minister. 
 
Confidence in the Government 
 
Article 66 
 
1. Once the Prime Minister selects the members of the government, the Prime Minister shall submit a 
request to the Legislative Council to hold a special session for a vote of confidence. The vote of 
confidence shall take place after hearing and discussing the written ministerial declaration which 
specifies the program and policy of the government. The session shall be held no later than one 
week from the date of submission of the request.  
2. The vote of confidence shall be cast for the Prime Minister and the members of the government 
together, unless the absolute majority of the members of the Legislative Council decides otherwise.  
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3. Confidence shall be granted to the government if it obtains the affirmative vote of the absolute 
majority of the Members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. 
 
Article 67 
 
After obtaining the vote of confidence and before assuming their offices, the Prime Minister and 
members of the government shall take the constitutional oath, stipulated in Article 35 of this Basic 
Law, before the President of the National Authority. 
 
Powers of the Prime Minister 
 
Article 68 
 
The Prime Minister shall exercise the following powers:  
1. To form or modify the composition of the Council of Ministers, to dismiss or accept the 
resignation of any of its members, or to fill a vacant position.  
2. To convene the Council of Ministers for weekly meetings, or when necessary, or upon a request 
from the President of the National Authority, as well as to set its agenda. 
3. To preside over sessions of the Council of Ministers.  
4. To manage the affairs of the Council of Ministers.  
5. To oversee the work of the Ministers and public institutions dependent on the government.  
6. To issue necessary decisions within the Prime Minister’s competence in accordance with the law.  
7. To sign and issue regulations approved by the Council of Ministers. 
8. The Prime Minister shall appoint a Minister to serve as deputy and to assume the duties of the 
Prime Minister, if the Prime Minister is absent. 
 
Powers of the Council of Ministers 
 
Article 69 
 
The Council of Ministers shall exercise the following powers:  
1. To devise general policies within the limits of its jurisdiction and in light of the ministerial 
program approved by the Legislative Council.  
2. To implement general policies adopted by the relevant Palestinian authorities.  
3. To prepare the general budget for presentation to the Legislative Council.  
4. To prepare the administrative apparatus, set its structure and provide it with all necessary means, 
as well as to supervise it and follow up on it.  
5. To follow up on the implementation of laws and to ensure compliance with their provisions, taking 
necessary actions in this regard.  
6. To supervise the performance of the ministries and all other components of the administrative 
apparatus in respect of their duties and functions, as well as to coordinate between them. 
7. To be responsible for maintaining public order and internal security. 
8. To discuss with various governmental bodies relevant to paragraphs 6 and 7 above their proposals 
and policies with regard to implementation of their respective responsibilities.  
9. (a) To establish or dissolve agencies, institutions, authorities and similar administrative units 
belonging to the executive apparatus of the government, provided that each shall be regulated by 
law.  
(b) To appoint heads of institutions and agencies mentioned above in subparagraph (a), and to 
supervise them in accordance with the provisions of the law.  
10. To specify the respective areas of responsibilities of all ministries, agencies and institutions, that 
report to the executive branch, and others of similar status.  
11. To assume any other responsibility assigned to it, in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
 
Article 70 
 
The Council of Ministers shall have the right to transmit draft laws to the Legislative Council, to issue 
regulations and to take necessary actions to implement laws.  
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Article 71 
 
Each Minister shall exercise the following powers and functions within their respective ministry:  
1. To propose the general policy for the ministry and to supervise its implementation after approval.  
2. To supervise the conduct of affairs in the ministry and to issue necessary instructions therefore.  
3. To implement the general budget within the funds allocated for the ministry.  
4. To propose bills and legislation related to the ministry and to present them to the Council of 
Ministers.  
5. A Minister may delegate certain powers to a Deputy Minister or to other senior officers in the 
ministry, within limits set by the law.  
 
Article 72 
 
Each Minister shall submit detailed reports to the Council of Ministers on the activities, policies, plans 
and achievements of their respective ministry in comparison with the objectives specified for the 
ministry within the framework of the General Plan, including the ministry’s proposals and 
recommendations concerning its future policies.  
 
These reports shall be submitted regularly every three months, so that the Council of Ministers remains 
well informed and has sufficient information about the activities and policies of each ministry.  
 
Meetings of the Council of Ministers 
 
Article 73 
 
1. Upon invitation of the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers shall meet periodically every 
week, or whenever necessary. Persons other than Ministers may not attend these meetings, unless 
there is a prior invitation from the Prime Minister. 
2. The meetings of the Council of Ministers shall be documented. 
 
Accountability of the Prime Minister and Ministers 
 
Article 74 
 
1. The Prime Minister is accountable to the President of the National Authority for his actions and the 
actions of his government.  
2. Ministers are accountable to the Prime Minister, each within the limits of their jurisdiction and for 
the actions of their respective ministry.  
3. The Prime Minister and members of the government are jointly and individually accountable to the 
Legislative Council. 
 
Article 75 
 
1. The President of the National Authority shall have the right to refer the Prime Minister for 
investigation as a result of crimes attributed to the Prime Minister during, or due to, the 
performance of official duties, in accordance with the provisions of law.  
2. The Prime Minister shall have the right to refer any Minister for investigation based on any of the 
reasons mentioned in the above paragraph 1, in accordance with the provisions of law.  
 
Article 76 
 
1. Any accused Minister shall be suspended from the performance of official duties immediately 
upon the issuance of an indictment. The termination of service shall not prevent continuing the 
investigation or follow-up procedures.  
2. The Attorney General, or a representative from the Public Prosecution, shall undertake the 
investigation and indictment procedures. If a trial ensues, it shall be conducted before an 
appropriate tribunal and shall follow the provisions and procedures prescribed in the Penal Code 
and in the Law of Criminal Procedure.  
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3. The above provisions shall apply to Deputy Ministers, Assistant Ministers and others of similar 
rank.  
 
Vote of No Confidence 
 
Article 77 
 
1. A minimum of ten Members of the Legislative Council may submit a request to the Speaker to 
hold a special session to withdraw confidence from the government or from any Minister after an 
investigation.  
2. The date of the first session shall be specified three days after the date of submitting the request. 
The session shall not be held later than two weeks after the date of the request. 
 
Article 78 
 
1. A vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and the government shall require an absolute 
majority of the Members of the Palestinian Legislative Council.  
2. A vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and the government shall result in the termination of 
their term. 
3. Upon the completion of the term of the Prime Minister and the government, they will temporarily 
exercise their powers in the capacity of a caretaker government, during which they may make 
decisions only insofar as they are necessary for the conduct of executive affairs until a new 
government is formed.  
 
Article 79 
 
1. In case the Legislative Council, by an absolute majority, casts a vote of no confidence in the Prime 
Minister, or in the Prime Minister and the members of the government collectively, the President 
of the National Authority shall present a new Prime Minister who will take over from the former 
within a period not to exceed two weeks from the date of the vote of no confidence. The new 
Prime Minister shall be subject to the provisions of this title.  
2. In case the Legislative Council casts a vote of no confidence in one or more members of the 
government, the Prime Minister shall present the new member or members to the following 
session, provided that it takes place within two weeks of the date of the no confidence vote. 
3. (a) Any addition or change that affects a portfolio, a Minister, or more than a Minister shall be 
considered a ministerial reshuffle, so long as it affects less than one-third of the members of the 
Council of Ministers. 
(b) Upon a ministerial reshuffle, the addition of a Minister, or the filling of a vacancy, for any 
reason, the new Minister or Ministers shall be presented at the very next session of the Legislative 
Council, which shall occur no later than two weeks from the date of the reshuffle or the occurrence 
of the vacancy, for a vote of confidence in accordance with the provisions of this article. 
4. Neither the Prime Minister nor any of the Ministers shall assume their duties until they have 
obtained the confidence of the Legislative Council. 
 
Financial Liability of Members of Council of Ministers 
 
Article 80 
 
1. The Prime Minister and each Minister shall submit a financial statement for themselves, their 
spouse and their minor children that details what they own in real estate, movable property, stocks, 
bonds, cash money and debts, whether inside Palestine or abroad, to the President of the National 
Authority, who shall make the necessary arrangements to maintain their secrecy. Such information 
shall remain confidential and may not be accessed unless permitted by the High Court when 
necessary. 
2. Neither the Prime Minister nor any Minister may purchase or lease any property belonging to the 
State or to any public entity, or have a financial interest in any contract concluded with any 
governmental or administrative body, nor may they, during their terms of office, be board 
members in any company, or practice commerce or any other profession, or receive a salary or any 
other financial reward or remuneration from any person in any capacity whatsoever, other than the 
single salary determined for Ministers and the relevant allowances. 
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Remuneration and Allowances of Prime Minister and Ministers 
 
Article 81 
 
Remuneration and allowances for the Prime Minister, Ministers and others of similar rank shall be 
determined by the law. 
 
Article 82 
 
The appointed Prime Minister and all Ministers shall be Palestinians who enjoy full civil and political 
rights. 
 
Article 83 
 
The government shall be considered dissolved and shall be reformed in accordance with the provisions 
of this title in the following cases:  
1. Upon the commencement of a new term of the Legislative Council.  
2. After a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, in the Prime Minister and the government, or 
in one-third or more of the total number of Ministers.  
3. Upon any addition, change, vacancy, or dismissal that involves at least one-third of the Council of 
Ministers.  
4. Upon the death of the Prime Minister. 
5. Upon the resignation of the Prime Minister, or the resignation of one-third or more of the members 
of government. 
6. Upon the dismissal of the Prime Minister by the President of the National Authority. 
 
Security Forces and Police 
 
Article 84 
 
1. The Security Forces and the Police are regular forces. They are the armed forces in the country. 
Their functions are limited to defending the country, serving the people, protecting society and 
maintaining public order, security and public morals. They shall perform their duties within the 
limits prescribed by law, with complete respect for rights and freedoms.  
2. The law shall regulate the Security Forces and the Police. 
 
Local Administration 
 
Article 85 
 
1. The law shall organize the country into local administrative units, which shall enjoy juridical 
personality. Each unit shall have a council elected directly, as prescribed by law.  
2. The law shall specify the areas of responsibility of the local administrative units, their financial 
resources, their relations with the central authority and their role in the preparation and 
implementation of development plans. The law shall specify the aspects of oversight over these 
units and their various activities.  
3. Demographic, geographic, economic and political parameters shall be taken into consideration at 
the time of defining the administrative divisions so as to preserve the territorial unity of the 
homeland and the interests of the communities therein.  
 
Public Administration 
 
Article 86 
 
The appointment of all public officials and governmental staff, and the conditions of their employment, 
shall be in accordance with the law.  
 
Article 87 
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The law shall regulate all affairs related to civil service. The Civil Service Department shall, in 
coordination with the relevant governmental bodies, upgrade and develop public administration. Its 
advice shall be sought upon drafting laws and regulations that deal with public administration and civil 
servants.  
 
Public Finance 
 
Article 88 
 
Public taxes and duties shall be imposed, amended and repealed only by law. No one may be totally or 
partially exempted, except in circumstances prescribed by law.  
 
Article 89 
 
The law shall state the provisions concerning the collection of public funds and the procedures for 
spending therefrom.  
 
Article 90 
 
The law shall specify the beginning and the end of the fiscal year, and shall regulate the public budget. 
If the public budget is not approved by the beginning of the new fiscal year, expenditures shall continue 
on the basis of a monthly allocation of one-twelfth (1/12) of the previous fiscal year’s budget, for each 
month.  
 
Article 91 
 
1. All revenues received – including taxes, duties, loans, grants and profits accruing to the Palestinian 
National Authority from managing its property or activities – shall be paid to the Public Treasury. 
No part of the Public Treasury funds may be allocated or spent for any purpose whatsoever except 
in accordance with the law.  
2. In accordance with the provisions of law, the Palestinian National Authority may form a strategic 
financial reserve, to encounter fluctuations and emergency situations.  
 
Article 92 
 
Public borrowing shall be concluded by law. It is not permitted to commit to a project which would 
require spending funds from the Public Treasury at a later stage unless approved by the Legislative 
Council.  
 
Article 93 
 
1. The law shall regulate the Monetary Authority, banks, the securities market, foreign exchange and 
insurance companies and all financial and credit institutions.  
2. The Governor of the Monetary Authority shall be appointed per a decision issued by the President 
of the National Authority and endorsed by the Palestinian Legislative Council.  
 
Article 94 
 
The law shall specify rules and procedures for granting privileges or imposing obligations related to the 
utilization of natural resources and public facilities. The law shall also detail the ways and means of 
dealing with real estate owned by the state and other public legal personalities, and the rules and 
procedures regulating them.  
 
Article 95 
 
The law shall specify the rules for granting wages, remuneration, pensions, subsidies and allowances 
incurring to the state’s treasury. The law shall also specify the bodies that will be responsible for their 
implementation. No exceptional funds shall be spent except within limits specified legally.  
 
Article 96 
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1. A Financial and Administrative Auditing Bureau shall be established by law to provide financial 
and administrative oversight to all apparatus and bodies of the National Authority, which shall 
include monitoring the collection of public revenues and spending therefrom, within the limits of 
the budget.  
2. The Bureau shall submit to the President of the National Authority and to the Legislative Council a 
report annually, or upon request, about its work and observations.  
3. The Chief of the Financial and Administrative Auditing Bureau shall be appointed pursuant to a 
decision issued by the President of the National Authority and endorsed by the Palestinian 
Legislative Council.  
 
TITLE SIX: 
THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
 
Article 97 
 
The judicial authority shall be independent and shall be exercised by the courts at different types and 
levels. The law shall determine the way they are constituted and their jurisdiction. They shall issue their 
rulings in accordance with the law. Judicial rulings shall be announced and executed in the name of the 
Palestinian Arab people.  
 
Article 98 
 
Judges shall be independent and shall not be subject to any authority other than the authority of the law 
while exercising their duties. No other authority may interfere in the judiciary or in judicial affairs.  
 
Article 99 
 
1. Appointment, transfer, secondment, delegation, promotion and questioning of judges shall be as 
prescribed in the Judicial Authority Law.  
2. Judges may not be dismissed except in cases that are allowed in the Judicial Authority Law.  
 
Article 100 
 
A High Judicial Council shall be created. The law shall specify the way it is constituted, its 
responsibilities and its operating rules. The High Judicial Council shall be consulted about draft laws 
relating to the Judicial Authority, including the Public Prosecution.  
 
Article 101 
 
1. Matters governed by Shari’a law and matters of personal status, shall come under the jurisdiction 
of Shari’a and religious courts, in accordance with the law.  
2. Military courts shall be established by special laws. Such courts may not have any jurisdiction 
beyond military affairs.  
 
Article 102 
 
Administrative courts may be established by law, to consider administrative disputes and disciplinary 
claims. Any other jurisdiction of such courts, and procedures to be followed before them, shall be 
specified by the law.  
 
Article 103 
 
1. A High Constitutional Court shall be established by law to consider:  
(a)  The constitutionality of laws, regulations, and other enacted rules.  
(b) The interpretation of the Basic Law and legislation. 
(c) Settlement of jurisdictional disputes which might arise between judicial entities and 
administrative entities having judicial jurisdiction.  
2. The law shall specify the manner in which the High Constitutional Court is formed and structured, 
the operating procedures it will follow and the effects resulting from its rulings.  
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Article 104 
 
The High Court shall temporarily assume all duties assigned to administrative courts and to the High 
Constitutional Court, unless they fall within the jurisdiction of other judicial entities, in accordance 
with applicable laws. 
 
Article 105 
 
Court hearings shall be public, unless a court decides to make them in camera due to considerations 
related to public order or public morals. In all cases, the sentence shall be pronounced in a public 
hearing.  
 
Article 106 
 
Judicial rulings shall be implemented. Refraining from or obstructing the implementation of a judicial 
ruling in any manner whatsoever shall be considered a crime carrying a penalty of imprisonment or 
dismissal from position if the accused individual is a public official or assigned to public service. The 
aggrieved party may file a case directly to the competent court and the National Authority shall 
guarantee a fair remedy for him.  
 
The Public Prosecution 
 
Article 107 
 
1. The Attorney General shall be appointed pursuant to a decision issued by the President of the 
National Authority, based upon a nomination submitted by the High Judicial Council.  
2. The Attorney General shall handle and assume public cases, in the name of the Palestinian Arab 
people. The jurisdiction, functions and duties of the Attorney General shall be specified by law.  
 
Article 108 
 
1. The law shall specify the manner of forming the Public Prosecution service, and its jurisdiction.  
2. The law shall determine the conditions for appointing, transferring and dismissing members of the 
Public Prosecution service and the rules of their accountability.  
 
Article 109 
 
A death sentence pronounced by any court may not be implemented unless endorsed by the President 
of the Palestinian National Authority.  
 
TITLE SEVEN: 
STATE OF EMERGENCY PROVISIONS 
 
Article 110 
 
1. The President of the National Authority may declare a state of emergency by decree when there is 
a threat to national security caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection or in times of natural 
disaster, for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days.  
2. The state of emergency may be extended for another period of thirty (30) days if a two-thirds 
majority of the members of the Legislative Council vote in favor of the extension.  
3. The decree declaring a state of emergency shall state its purpose, the region to which it applies and 
its duration.  
4. The Legislative Council shall have the right to review all or some of the procedures and measures 
adopted during the state of emergency, at the first session convened after the declaration of the 
state of emergency or in the extension session, whichever comes earlier, and to conduct the 
necessary interpellation in this regard.  
 
Article 111 
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It is not allowed to impose restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms when declaring a state of 
emergency except to the extent necessary to fulfill the purpose stated in the decree declaring the state 
of emergency. 
 
Article 112 
 
Any arrest resulting from the declaration of a state of emergency shall be subject to the following 
minimum requirements:  
1. Any detention carried out pursuant to a state of emergency decree shall be reviewed by the 
Attorney General, or by the appropriate court, within a time period not to exceed fifteen (15) days 
from the date of detention.  
2. The detained individual shall have the right to select and appoint a lawyer. 
  
Article 113 
 
The Palestinian Legislative Council may not be dissolved or its work hindered during a state of 
emergency, nor shall the provisions of this title be suspended.  
 
Article 114 
 
All provisions regulating states of emergency that were applicable in Palestine prior to the entry into 
force of this Basic Law shall be cancelled, including the [British] Mandate Defense (Emergency) 
Regulations issued in the year 1945.  
 
TITLE EIGHT: 
GENERAL & TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 115 
 
The provisions of this Basic Law shall apply during the interim period and may be extended until the 
entry into force of the new Constitution of the State of Palestine.  
 
Article 116 
 
Laws shall be promulgated in the name of the Palestinian Arab people and shall be published 
immediately in the Official Gazette. These laws shall come into force thirty (30) days from the date of 
their publication, unless the law states otherwise.  
 
Article 117 
 
Laws shall apply only to that which occurs after their entry into force. It may be stipulated otherwise 
when necessary, except for penal matters.  
 
Article 118 
 
Laws, regulations and decisions in force in Palestine before the implementation of this law shall remain 
in force to the extent that they do not contradict the provisions of this Basic Law, until they are 
amended or repealed, in accordance with the law.  
 
Article 119 
 
All legal provisions that contradict the provisions of this Amended Basic Law are repealed.  
 
Article 120 
 
The provisions of this Amended Basic Law may not be amended except by a majority vote of at least 
two-thirds of the members of the Palestinian Legislative Council.  
 
Article 121 
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This Amended Basic Law shall be effective as of its publication in the Official Gazette.  
 
 
Issued in Ramallah City on March 18, 2003  
Corresponding to Muharam 15, 1424 H.  
 
Yasser Arafat  
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the  
Palestine Liberation Organization, and 
President of the Palestinian National Authority  
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Annex 5: Comparing the Basic Law and the Draft Palestinian Constitution  
 
 
Topic Basic Law  
with latest 
modifications (2005)
45
 
3
rd
 draft of DPC 
(2003)
46
 
Comments 
    
R
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In the introduction it 
was mentioned that: 
"the enactment and 
ratification of this law 
by the Legislative 
Council does spring 
from the fact that the 
Palestine Liberation 
Organization is the sole 
and legitimate 
representative of the 
Arab Palestinian 
people".  
 - The DPC does not refer to 
the PLO.  
- The state, once established, 
will replace the PA but there 
is no possibility to 
understand from the DPC 
what shall be the 
consequences on the PLO 
and the perspectives of its 
cooperation/relation with the 
state.  
R
e
fe
r
e
n
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 t
o
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r
a
b
 
N
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o
n
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n
d
/o
r 
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m
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a
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o
n
 
Article (1) 
Palestine is part of the 
larger Arab world, and 
the Palestinian people 
are part of the Arab 
nation. (…) 
 
Article (2) 
Palestine is part of the Arab 
nation. The state of 
Palestine abides by the 
charter of the League of 
Arab States. The Palestinian 
people are part of the Arab 
and Islamic nations. (…) 
- Only the DPC refers to the 
Islamic Nation and to the 
charter of the League of 
Arab States. .  
S
e
p
a
r
a
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o
n
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f 
P
o
w
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s 
Article (2) 
The people are the 
source of power, which 
shall be exercised 
through the legislative, 
executive and judicial 
authorities, based upon 
the principle of 
separation of powers 
and in the manner set 
forth in this Basic Law.  
 
Article (64) 
National sovereignty belongs 
to the people, who are the 
source of the authorities. 
They exercise their duties 
directly through referenda 
and general elections or 
through representatives of 
the electorate, within its 
three general powers (…)  
 
Article (65) 
The relationship between the 
three public authorities shall 
be based on equality and 
independence. They shall 
exercise their authority on 
the basis of relative 
separation with respect to 
their duties and mutual 
cooperation and oversight. 
(…)  
- DPC provides possibilities 
to put in practice popular 
sovereignty through 
referendum in equal terms 
with general elections and 
through representatives.  
- The DPC is an explanation 
of the principle of separation 
of powers understood as 
checks and balances.  
                                                
45 Translation into English for the Palestine Yearbook of International Law, published in Al-Muqtafi – 
Institute of Law, Birzeit University. http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/LegTextE.asp?FORM_LEG_ID=14138  
46 English version used here was published by Jerusalem Media and Communication Center 
(http://www.jmcc.org/documents/palestineconstitution-eng.pdf ); the english version was compared to 
Nathan Brown translation (http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2003/nbrowne.pdf) and Arabic version 
published by Palestine Media Center (http://www.palestine-
pmc.com/arabic/inside1.asp?x=779&cat=3&opt=1) and sometimes changed accordingly.  
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Article (6) 
The principle of the rule 
of law shall be the basis 
of government in 
Palestine. All 
governmental powers, 
agencies, institutions 
and individuals shall be 
subject to the law.  
 
Article (9) 
Government shall be based 
on the principles of the rule 
of law and justice. All 
authorities, agencies, 
departments, institutions and 
individuals shall abide by the 
law. 
 
- The rule of law constitutes a 
basic principle for both 
constitutional documents.  
S
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e
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 Article (10) 
All activities of the 
Palestinian public authorities 
shall, in normal and 
exceptional circumstances, 
be subject to administrative, 
political, legal and judicial 
review and control. 
There shall be no provision 
of law which grants 
immunity to any 
administrative action or 
decision from judicial 
supervision. 
The state shall be bound to 
compensate for damages 
resulting from errors, and 
risks resulting from actions 
and procedures carried out 
by state officials in the 
pursuit of their duties. 
- DPC intends to create a 
compensation administrative 
jurisdiction.  
- It shall be noted that 
according to existent legal 
system in territories under 
PA control, the High Court 
of Justice is the only level of 
administrative Courts and it 
has only nullification power, 
in cases provided by law.  
R
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n
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Article (4) 
1. Islam is the official 
religion in Palestine. 
Respect for the sanctity 
of all other divine 
religions shall be 
maintained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The principles of 
Islamic Shari’a shall be 
a principal source of 
legislation.  
Article (5) 
Arabic and Islam are the 
official Palestinian language 
and religion. Christianity and 
all other monotheistic 
religions shall be equally 
revered and respected. The 
Constitution guarantees 
equality in rights and duties 
to all citizens irrespective of 
their religious belief. 
 
Article (7) 
The principles of Islamic 
Shari’a are a principle source 
of legislation. Civil and 
religious matters of the 
followers of monotheistic 
religions shall be organized 
in accordance with their 
religious teachings and 
denominations within the 
framework of law (…). 
- DPC gathers language and 
religion as if they are both 
considered as part of 
Palestinian traditions.  
- For this reason, the same 
article provides that this 
article will have no legal 
consequences on non-
Muslims. 
 
 
 
- Only the DPC refers to 
possibilities of monotheistic 
religions to (continue to) 
legislate in personal status 
issues.  
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Article (5) 
The governing system 
in Palestine shall be a 
democratic 
representative system, 
based upon political and 
party pluralism. (…) 
Article (8) 
The Palestinian political 
system shall be a 
parliamentarian 
representative democracy 
based on political pluralism. 
(…) 
 
- DPC provides expressly that 
Palestinian political system 
is parliamentarian. 
Something that is not 
supposed to be declared or 
provided in a constitutional 
text but rather should be 
understood from the kind of 
separation of powers the 
constitution creates.  
- Following the analysis of the 
system in Palestine, one may 
note the existence of some 
elements of presidential 
system.  
- For this reason, some ended 
by qualifying the Palestinian 
political system as being 
semi presidential, 
rationalized parliamentarian 
or mixed system.  
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Article (5) 
(…) The President of 
the National Authority 
shall be directly elected 
by the people. (…)  
Article (34) 
The President (…) shall 
be elected in a general 
and direct election (…)  
Article (36) 
The term of the 
presidency of the 
National Authority shall 
be four years. The 
President shall have the 
right to nominate 
himself for a second 
term of presidency (…) 
Article (115) 
The President shall be 
elected directly by the 
people for a five year term 
renewable once. 
 
- The DPC provides for five 
year term and renewable 
once only. 
- The newly amended article 
36 (the 2005 amendments) 
provides for four years 
mandate renewable only 
once.  
- Original text had extended 
mandate of President to the 
Interim period.  
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Article (35) 
Before assuming office, 
the President shall take 
the following oath 
before the Legislative 
Council and in the 
presence of the Speaker 
of the Palestinian 
National Council and 
the President of the 
High Court: (…) 
Article (116) 
The elected president shall 
assume his duties 
immediately upon 
conclusion of his 
predecessor’s term.  
Prior to exercising the duties 
of his office, the president 
shall take the following 
constitutional 
oath, before the House of 
Representatives and in the 
presence of the head of the 
supreme judicial 
council: (…) 
- In the DPC, the speaker of 
the PNC is not present while 
the reference is done to the 
President of the High 
Judicial Council and not the 
President of the High Court 
(although, they are to be 
covered by the same person).  
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 Article (113) 
The President of the State is 
the President of the 
Republic. He shall uphold 
the Constitution and the 
unity of the people. He shall 
guarantee the continuity of 
the existence of the state and 
its national independence. 
He shall guarantee the 
proper functioning of the 
public authorities. He shall 
exercise his jurisdiction, and 
his responsibilities shall be 
determined pursuant to the 
provisions of the 
Constitution. (…) 
- The DPC presents list of 
powers and qualifications 
that are related to the 
President in his capacity of 
"head of state". 
- The DPC states a complete 
list of prerogatives (art. 125) 
including the co-signature 
power to engage 
responsibility of ministries.  
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Article (38) 
The President of the 
National Authority shall 
exercise his executive 
duties as specified in 
this law. 
Article (63) 
(…) Except for the 
executive powers of the 
President of the 
National Authority, as 
specified in this Basic 
Law, executive and 
administrative powers 
shall be within the 
competence of the 
Council of Ministers. 
Article (113) 
(…) Except those powers 
that are constitutionally 
attributed to the president of 
the State, the government’s 
executive and administrative 
duties shall be the 
responsibility of the Cabinet. 
- Executive authority of the 
President is exclusive to the 
provisions of the BL and 
DPC.  
- Other powers of the 
President of the PA, in his 
capacity of an elected 
President, are not necessarily 
provided in the BL in 
exhaustive way.  
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Article (63) 
The Council of 
Ministers (the 
“government”) is the 
highest executive and 
administrative 
instrument; it shoulders 
the responsibility for 
implementing the 
program that has been 
approved by the 
legislative branch. (…) 
 
Article (68) 
The Prime Minister 
shall exercise the 
following powers: (…) 
3. To preside over 
sessions of the Council 
of Ministers. (…) 
 
Article (145) 
The executive authority shall 
be entrusted with the council 
of ministers. 
 
 
 
 
Article (140) 
The prime minister practices 
the following competencies: 
(…) 
- He calls the council of 
ministers to meet, sets its 
agenda of which he informs 
the president of the state, he 
presides its sessions except 
the ones attended by the 
president of the state. (…) 
 
- Government (Cabinet) and 
Council of Ministers are 
used as synonymous in the 
BL and the DPC.  
- The Prime Minister presides 
the Council of Ministers, 
unless in those cases when 
the President is Present in 
the meetings of the Council 
of Ministers.  
- In other systems, with 
similar constitutional 
arrangements like France, 
the President of the Republic 
is the President of the 
Council of Ministers and 
exceptionally the Prime 
Minister. Thus, in France, 
the Council of Ministers is 
distinguished from the 
cabinet; the later being 
synonymous to the Prime 
Minister and the Ministers 
only.  
- Executive powers of the 
Prime minister and the 
Council of Ministers are 
provided in specific articles. 
However, all other executive 
powers, except those 
expressly done to the 
President, are of competence 
of the Cabinet.  
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Article (45) 
The President of the 
National Authority shall 
appoint the Prime 
Minister and authorize 
the latter to constitute 
his government. The 
President shall have the 
right to dismiss the 
Prime Minister or to 
accept his resignation 
and to request him to 
convene the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
Article (122) 
After consultations with the 
representative parties, the 
president shall nominate the 
prime minister from the 
party that obtained the 
largest number of seats in 
the House of 
Representatives. 
If the formation of a 
government is impossible 
within a three week period, 
the President nominates a 
prime minister from the 
party that obtained the 
second highest number of 
seats (…). 
- The DPC had codified the 
constitutional 'urf (custom) 
of the President assigning 
for the office of prime 
Minister, first to the 
nominee of the party in 
majority at the 
Parliamentary assembly. In 
case of failure, he may 
nominate the nominee of the 
second party and so on.  
 
 Article (46) 
The Council of 
Ministers shall assist 
the President in the 
performance of the 
President’s duties and 
exercise of powers, in 
the manner stipulated in 
this Basic Law.  
 
Article (121) 
The president of the state 
may direct the Cabinet in 
setting the general policy. 
 
- Article 46 was important in 
the 2002 BL where there 
was not the office of Prime 
Minister; following the 
2003, it is unclear the 
relevance of such a 
provision and the legal 
consequences on the 
President's power towards 
the Cabinet members.  
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- The DPC, on the contrary, 
added a problematic article 
in which the President may 
involve in setting the general 
policy, which is normally 
the prerogative of the 
cabinet, responsible in front 
of the parliamentary 
assembly.  
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Article (39) 
The President of the 
National Authority is 
the Commander-in-
Chief of the Palestinian 
Forces. 
Article (127) 
The president of the state is 
the supreme commander of 
the Palestinian national 
security forces which is 
headed by a concerned 
minister. 
- The DPC tries to figure out 
how possibly the 
relationship between 
President-Cabinet (or 
Minister) concerning 
security forces.  
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Article (40) 
The President of the 
National Authority shall 
appoint and terminate 
the services of the 
National Authority’s 
delegates to foreign 
countries, international 
organizations and 
foreign agencies. The 
President shall accept 
the credentials of 
foreign delegates to the 
Palestinian National 
Authority.  
 
Article (126) 
Upon the recommendation 
of the minister of foreign 
affairs, the president of the 
State shall appoint, and 
terminate the duties of, 
ambassadors and 
representatives of the state of 
Palestine to states, regional 
and international 
organizations. He shall 
receive the credentials of 
representatives of foreign 
states and representatives of 
regional and international 
organizations to the state of 
Palestine. 
 
- According to Oslo 
agreements, foreign affairs 
are not of competence of the 
PA.  
- The PLO remained, 
theoretically, the 
representative of the 
Palestinian people and had 
(originally) the power 
(through political 
department and Executive 
Committee) to nominate 
Palestine's representative 
offices.  
- However, the PA had 
acquired de facto power over 
Palestinian representation 
offices that became also 
financially dependent on the 
PA.  
- The PLC had adopted a 
controversial Diplomatic 
Corps law n. 13 of 2005.  
- The DPC provides that 
nominations are done upon 
recommendation of minister 
of foreign affairs.  
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Article (41) 
1. The President of the 
National Authority shall 
promulgate the laws 
voted by the Palestinian 
Legislative Council 
within thirty (30) days 
of their transmittal to 
him. The President may 
refer a law back to the 
Legislative Council 
with his observations 
and the reasons of his 
objection within the 
same period. Otherwise, 
the law will be deemed 
promulgated and will be 
published in the Official 
Gazette.  
2. If the President of the 
National Authority 
returns the proposed 
law to the Legislative 
Council in conformity 
with the time limit and 
conditions specified in 
the previous paragraph, 
the Council shall debate 
the law again. If the 
Council passes the law 
a second time by a 
majority of two-thirds 
of its members, the 
proposed law shall be 
considered approved 
and shall be 
immediately published 
in the Official Gazette.  
 
Article (123) 
The president of the state 
shall ratify laws after their 
approval by the House of 
Representatives, within 
thirty days of their referral to 
him, and he orders their 
publication. 
The president of the state 
may object to a draft law that 
was approved by the House 
of 
Representatives, and may 
request its reconsideration 
accompanied by the reasons 
for his objection within 
thirty days of having 
received such draft law. If 
the mentioned legal time 
limit ends without ratifying 
the law or objecting to it, it 
would be considered 
effective and should be 
published in the official 
gazette. 
If the president of the state 
returns the law previously 
approved by the House of 
Representatives within the 
legal time limit, and such 
draft receives a second 
approval by the House of 
Representatives by a 
majority of two thirds of its 
members, it shall be 
considered a law and so 
promulgated. 
- There are no changes 
between the BL and the 
DPC concerning the 
procedures of ratification 
or objection of laws. 
However, the DPC is –here 
again- more detailed.  
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Article (43) 
The President of the 
National Authority shall 
have the right, in cases 
of necessity that cannot 
be delayed, and when 
the Legislative Council 
is not in session, to 
issue decrees that have 
the power of law. These 
decrees shall be 
presented to the 
Legislative Council in 
the first session 
convened after their 
issuance; otherwise they 
will cease to have the 
power of law. If these 
decrees are presented to 
the Legislative Council, 
as mentioned above, but 
are not approved by the 
latter, then they shall 
cease to have the power 
of law.  
 
Article (130) 
After the declaration of the 
state of emergency, the 
Council of Ministers may, if 
events necessitate the taking 
of speedy measures to 
confront situations that 
cannot be delayed, issue 
decrees that gain approval by 
the president within a period 
not exceeding fifteen days 
and then have the force of 
law. They are to be 
presented to the House of 
Representatives in its first 
meeting after the declaration 
of the state of emergency, or 
in the session to extend the 
state of emergency, 
whichever occurs first, to 
decide upon it, otherwise 
they lose their legal force 
retroactively. Should the 
House of Representatives 
not approve them, they shall 
cease to have legal effect, 
and the house would decide 
how to remedy its effects 
without any prejudice to 
material rights of third 
parties. 
- The DPC changed 
substantively the article 
concerning decree-laws. It is 
the Council of Ministers 
who may adopt decree-laws 
(endorsed then by the 
President) and only in the 
state of emergency.  
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Article (5) 
 
(…) The government 
shall be accountable to 
the President and to the 
Palestinian Legislative 
Council. (…)  
Article (74) 
1. The Prime Minister 
is accountable to the 
President of the 
National Authority for 
his actions and the 
actions of his 
government.  
2. Ministers are 
accountable to the 
Prime Minister, each 
within the limits of their 
jurisdiction and for the 
actions of their 
respective ministry.  
3. The Prime Minister 
and members of the 
government are jointly 
and individually 
accountable to the 
Legislative Council. 
 
 
 
 
 
Article (137) 
The prime minister shall 
preside over the activities of 
the government. Every 
minister shall be answerable 
to the Cabinet in accordance 
to the procedures as 
specified by the 
constitutional rules. 
The prime minister and the 
ministers are individually 
and jointly responsible 
before the House of 
Representatives for the 
actions of the government. 
 
- The BL provides that the 
Prime Minister is also 
accountable to the President. 
There is no similar provision 
in the DPC 
 
 
- Article of BL 74, Contrary 
to article 5, states that only 
Prime minister is 
accountable to the President. 
However, it is only apparent 
contradiction since the 
resignation of the Prime 
minister means the 
dissolution of the 
government (art. 83: 3-4).  
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Article (37) 
(…) 2. If the office of 
the President of the 
National Authority 
becomes vacant due to 
any of the above cases, 
the Speaker of the 
Palestinian Legislative 
Council shall 
temporarily assume the 
powers and duties of the 
Presidency of the 
National Authority for a 
period not to exceed 
sixty (60) days, during 
which free and direct 
elections to elect a new 
President shall take 
place in accordance 
with the Palestinian 
Election Law.  
 
Article (120) 
If the office of the president 
becomes vacant or the House 
of Representatives decides to 
charge him in accordance 
with Article (132) from the 
Constitution, the President 
of the Council of Ministers 
shall assume presidency of 
the state for a period not 
exceeding sixty days, during 
which presidential elections 
are carried out in accordance 
with electoral laws. 
Should the President of the 
Council of Ministers wish to 
submit his candidacy for 
presidency, or should a legal 
hindrance prevent him from 
assuming presidency, the 
head of the Constitutional 
Court shall assume 
presidency temporarily until 
election of the president. The 
head of the court may not be 
a presidential candidate. 
- The DPC provides a very 
interesting –not very much 
debated- article: it is the 
Prime Minister, not the 
Speaker of the Legislative 
assembly that will have the 
presidency ad interim, in 
case of vacancy of the office 
of the President.  
- In case of incapacity, it is 
the President of the 
Constitutional Court.  
L
e
g
is
la
ti
v
e 
C
o
u
n
c
il
 M
a
n
d
a
te
 
Article (47) 
1. The Palestinian 
Legislative Council is 
the elected legislative 
authority.  
2. The Legislative 
Council shall assume its 
legislative and oversight 
duties as prescribed in 
its Standing Orders, 
insofar as they do not 
contradict the 
provisions of this law. 
3. The term of the 
Legislative Council 
shall be four years from 
the date of its being 
elected and the elections 
shall be conducted once 
each four years in a 
regular manner.  
 
Article (47 bis)  
The term of the current 
Legislative Council 
shall terminate when the 
members of the new 
elected Council take the 
constitutional oath.  
Article (66) 
The House of 
Representatives shall assume 
legislative power. It shall 
endorse the general budget, 
which shall be prepared by 
the Cabinet. It shall 
supervise the actions of the 
executive branch in the 
manner specified by the 
Constitution. 
Article (68) 
Members of the House of 
Representatives are elected 
for five years and may be re-
elected more than once. The 
term of the House of 
Representatives may not be 
extended except in case of 
necessity and by virtue of a 
law ratified by two-thirds of 
the total number of the 
House of Representatives. 
 
- Clause 3 of the BL was 
amended in 2005. The 
original text: "The term of 
this Council shall be the 
interim period". This 
interesting change reflects 
the fact that transitional PA 
is becoming more 
institutionalized into central 
authority of a state and that 
the interim period may 
become permanent. Article 
47 bis also was added in the 
2005 amendments.  
 
- In the DPC, under the title 
"legislative branch", there is 
a reference to a House of 
Representatives who 
assumes the legislative 
power (66-109) and a 
Consultative Council (110-
112) with no legislative 
authority. The last council 
was at center of debates for 
being formed of Palestinians 
of the Diaspora, thus, 
questioning on the status of 
the PLO institution, mainly 
the PNC following the 
establishment of the state.  
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The BL does not 
provide for the 
dissolution of the PLC 
or anticipated elections.  
Article (89) 
In case of necessity, the 
President of the State, or the 
speaker of the Council of 
ministers may suggest 
dissolution of the House of 
Representatives. If the 
dissolution is ratified by 
two-thirds of the members of 
the Council of ministers, the 
President of the State shall 
issue the decree of 
dissolution. 
The Government shall then 
call for election of a new 
House of Representatives 
within sixty days and in 
accordance to the procedure 
defined by the election law. 
If elections are not held, the 
House resumes its duties 
until a new House is elected. 
The House of 
Representatives may not be 
dissolved within the first 
year of its formation, or 
during the period of a 
declared ‘state of 
emergency’ as provided for 
in the Constitution. 
 
- Contrary to the BL, the DPC 
contains a possibility of 
dissolution of the elected 
legislative body. However, it 
gives this power to the 
Council of Ministers 
although with a decree from 
the President.  
- Different interpretations may 
be given to the absence of 
provisions in the BL 
concerning the possibility to 
end the PLC mandate 
outside the regular elections 
each four years. The absence 
is interpreted as an 
interdiction or as permission 
according to the point of 
view defended.  
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Article (50) 
In its first meeting, the 
Council shall elect a 
Speaker, two Deputies 
to the Speaker, and a 
Secretary-General. 
Together, they shall 
make up the Office of 
the Legislative Council. 
It shall not be permitted 
to be a member of the 
Office and hold at the 
same time the position 
of President of the 
National Authority, or 
Minister, or any other 
governmental position.  
 
Article (70) 
In the first meeting of the 
first annual session, the 
House of Representatives 
shall elect its speaker, two 
deputies, and a secretary-
general. They shall 
constitute the body of the 
presidency of the House of 
Representatives. Members of 
the body of the presidency of 
the House of Representatives 
may not assume ministerial 
or other governmental post. 
A member of the House of 
Representatives may assume 
the post of minister, 
provided that the total 
number of Deputies 
Ministers in government 
does not exceed 50% of the 
total number of ministers. 
 
- According to BL, only 
members of the Office of the 
Presidency are forbidden 
from having governmental 
positions. It is not clear, 
however, if there are 
limitations of possible 
number of ministers that are 
possibly nominated from 
within the deputies and 
whither it is possible for 
them, once in function, to 
participate in the vote as 
other deputies with possible 
impact on the principle of 
separation of powers. 
- The DPC provides expressly 
that a deputy can be a 
minister but the total number 
of deputies-ministers shall 
not exceed 50%.  
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Article (56) 
Each Member of the 
Legislative Council 
shall have the following 
rights:  
(…)  
2. To propose laws. 
Rejected proposals may 
not be resubmitted 
within the same term. 
(…) 
 
Article (70) 
The Council of 
Ministers shall have the 
right to transmit draft 
laws to the Legislative 
Council, to issue 
regulations and to take 
necessary actions to 
implement laws.  
Article (78) 
The President of the State in 
accordance with a decision 
of the council of ministers, 
the speaker of the House of 
Representatives or five of its 
members, shall have the 
right to suggest draft laws. 
Each suggestion that does 
obtain the approbation of the 
required majority may not be 
submitted for discussion in 
the same session, except by 
decision that is approved by 
a two-thirds majority of the 
House of Representatives. 
 
- DPC gives the right to 
present draft laws to the 
President not to the Cabinet.  
- DPC gives possibilities to 
five deputies (not one as in 
the BL) to present draft 
laws.  
- Several studies had 
suggested the adoption of 
similar provision in the BL 
where a single deputy is not 
granted the possibility to 
initiate legislative process 
and to give priority to 
governmental proposed draft 
laws.  
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Article (97) 
The judicial authority 
shall be independent 
and shall be exercised 
by the courts at 
different types and 
levels. The law shall 
determine the way they 
are constituted and their 
jurisdiction. They shall 
issue their rulings in 
accordance with the 
law. Judicial rulings 
shall be announced and 
executed in the name of 
the Palestinian Arab 
people.  
Article (98) 
Judges shall be 
independent and shall 
not be subject to any 
authority other than the 
authority of the law 
while exercising their 
duties. No other 
authority may interfere 
in the judiciary or in 
judicial affairs.  
Article (162) 
The judicial branch shall be 
independent. It shall have 
original jurisdiction to 
perform the judicial 
function, and shall be 
entrusted with deciding all 
disputes and crimes. 
The law shall define the 
institutions of the judicial 
branch, and regulate their 
structure and the types of 
courts, and their levels, 
jurisdictions and procedures. 
Exceptional courts may not 
be formed. 
Article (171) 
Judges are independent. 
There shall be no authority 
over them in their judicial 
duties except and their 
conscience, and shall not be 
removed. The law shall 
arrange disciplinary 
questioning of judges before 
the Supreme Judicial 
Council in cases defined by 
without infringement on 
their independence in 
performing their duties. 
No person whatsoever shall 
be permitted to obstruct 
justice or the execution of 
final judicial sentences. (…) 
- Article 99 of the BL 
provides further guarantees 
for independence of Judges. 
The same applies for the 
DPC.  
- Both the BL and the DPC 
adopts the double vision of 
independence related to 
judiciary: the independence 
of the (judicial) institution 
and the independence of the 
judge himself.  
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Article (100) 
A High Judicial Council 
shall be created. The 
law shall specify the 
way it is constituted, its 
responsibilities and its 
operating rules. The 
High Judicial Council 
shall be consulted about 
draft laws relating to the 
Judicial Authority, 
including the Public 
Prosecution.  
Article (163) 
A High Judicial Council 
shall be entrusted with the 
affairs of the judicial 
institutions. (…) This 
council shall be consulted on 
draft laws regulating judicial 
affairs. This council shall 
have the right to set its own 
internal regulation. 
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Article (101) 
1. Matters governed by 
Shari’a law and matters 
of personal status, shall 
come under the 
jurisdiction of Shari’a 
and religious courts, in 
accordance with the 
law. (…) 
There is no direct reference 
in the DPC of the 
jurisdiction of religious and 
shari'a courts.  
- The DPC does not make 
direct reference to existent 
duality of jurisdiction 
between civil/Shari'a & 
religious courts; however, it 
leaves for monotheistic 
religions the power to 
legislate in personal status 
affairs. Indirectly it may 
mean the continuation of 
precedent situation; 
however, it may be 
interpreted as the beginning 
of ending such a duality.  
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Article (101) 
(…) 
2. Military courts shall 
be established by 
special laws. Such 
courts may not have any 
jurisdiction beyond 
military affairs.  
 
Article (175) 
A military court shall be 
established and entrusted 
with deciding military 
disputes. It shall not decide 
any case outside the military 
sphere. 
 
- There are common 
provisions intending into 
keeping military courts 
limited to military affairs.  
- Both constitutional texts talk 
about necessity to be 
established by law. Until 
now, military courts are 
governed by PLO penal 
code.  
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Article (102) 
Administrative courts 
may be established by 
law, to consider 
administrative disputes 
and disciplinary claims. 
Any other jurisdiction 
of such courts, and 
procedures to be 
followed before them, 
shall be specified by the 
law.  
Article (174) 
A high court of justice shall 
be established to decide 
administrative disputes and 
disciplinary cases as they are 
defined by their establishing 
law. Such law shall regulate 
its rules of operation, the 
terms of appointment of its 
judges and employees and 
the procedures to be 
followed before it. 
Lower administrative courts 
may be established by law. 
- The BL and DPC left the 
issue of establishing 
constitutional courts as an 
option, contrary to 
constitutional court.  
- The High Court of Justice 
remains the only level of 
administrative courts.  
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Article (103) 
1. A High 
Constitutional Court 
shall be established by 
law to consider:  
(a)  The 
constitutionality of 
laws, regulations, and 
other enacted rules.  
(b) The 
interpretation of the 
Basic Law and 
legislation. 
(c) Settlement of 
jurisdictional disputes 
which might arise 
between judicial entities 
and administrative 
entities having judicial 
jurisdiction.  
2. The law shall specify 
the manner in which the 
High Constitutional 
Court is formed and 
structured, the operating 
procedures it will 
follow and the effects 
resulting from its 
rulings.  
Article (104) 
The High Court shall 
temporarily assume all 
duties assigned to 
administrative courts 
and to the High 
Constitutional Court, 
unless they fall within 
the jurisdiction of other 
judicial entities, in 
accordance with 
applicable laws. 
 
 
Article (181) 
A Constitutional Court shall 
be established by virtue of 
the Constitution to exercise 
its 
jurisdiction independently in 
order to preserve the legality 
of the work of state 
institutions.(…) 
Article (185) 
The Constitutional Court 
shall examine the 
constitutionality of the 
following matters (…): 
- The constitutionality of 
laws before they are 
promulgated (…); 
- Deciding disputes related 
to the constitutionality of 
laws, ordinances, 
regulations, measures and 
decisions issued by the 
president or the council of 
ministers which have the 
force of law; 
- Interpretation of 
constitutional texts when a 
dispute arises over the rights, 
duties and 
competencies of the three 
branches, and in case of a 
jurisdictional dispute 
between the head of state 
and the prime minister; 
- Deciding problems that 
arise concerning the 
constitutionality of programs 
and activities of political 
parties and associations (…); 
- The constitutionality of 
signing treaties and the 
procedures of their 
implementation (…) 
- Any other jurisdictions 
assigned to it by the 
Constitution. 
- The BL states that a High 
constitutional court shall be 
established but leaves the 
issue for a law. Law no. 3 of 
2006 establishing a 
constitutional Court was 
finally adopted but it 
contains several problematic 
issues that were outlined in 
the body of the report, as 
expressed in several public 
debates on the topic.  
- On the contrary, the DPC 
provides the establishment 
of a High Constitutional 
Court and includes several 
articles regulating it.  
- Interesting to note that, 
according to DPC, the HCC 
shall be responsible for 
resolving possible conflicts 
between the President and 
the Council of Ministers.  
 
 
 
